ASI Blog in the News: Catharin Dalpino Testifies on China’s Activities in Southeast Asia

Catharin Dalpino, who also blogs here at the Asia Security Initiative Blog, testified February 4 before the U.S.-China Economic Economic and Security Review Commission on “China’s Activities in Southeast Asia and the Implications for U.S. Interests.”

She makes six recommendations:

1. Commit to an annual US-ASEAN Summit, and use it as a vehicle to bring the President of the United States to Southeast Asia once a year.
2. Reassure Southeast Asians that the United States will not decrease its presence in the South China Sea. 
3. Press Beijing to become part of the Mekong River Commission, which would help legitimate discussion and action to remediate the environmental, human health and employment impacts of developments on the Mekong. 
4. Address the drift in US-Thai relations with a dialogue process to reinvigorate the alliance and lower tensions over specific issues.
5. Let the new engagement policy with Burma play out in the fullness of time. 
6. Consider the benefits of legislation introduced to extend trade preferences to Asian Least Developed Countries, similar to those given to African and Caribbean countries.

Read the entire testimony here.

Posted by Matthew Shannon Stumpf on February 8, 2010. Respond »

Indian commentator on US Afghanistan policy

Afghanistan is very important to India. Cultural and historical ties underpin strategic importance as far as Indians are concerned. The recent London conference received some attention from Indian experts. Here is one view, to which I will hopefully add others.

Shekhar Gupta, Goodbye, America, Indian Express, February 6, 2010.

Posted by Swarna Rajagopalan on February 5, 2010. Respond »

The Great Meltdown: India Offers to Resume Talks with Pakistan

Finally, India has proposed a foreign secretary-level talk with Pakistan, in a remarkable departure of what Pakistan terms as traditional ‘inflexibility’. So a sign of thaw is apparent now. It has to be remembered that all bilateral engagements have been stalled between the two South Asian countries since the Nov 2008 Mumbai terror events. Among Pakistan’s best step forward is the acknowledgement of Lashkar-e-Taiba as the perpetrators of 26/11 Mumbai attacks. This one is a positive step taken by Pakistan in recent times.

On the sidelines of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SARRC) summit later this month, internal (Home) affairs ministers of both countries will meet in the garrison city of Rawalpindi (February 26- 27), which will pave the way for a much awaited meet between the foreign secretaries of the two countries. For obvious reasons, terrorism would be the prime focus of the meet, though the agendas of the proposed talks are yet to be confirmed. The latest ‘defreezing’ comes at a time when the bilateral ties between New Delhi and Islamabad are all time low with war of words from both sides virtually dominated the airwaves. Badly worded statements too became the order of the day which polluted the already tensed atmosphere. (e.g.  Pakistan’s Food Minister Nazar Muhammad Gondal’s statement mentioning that ‘Pakistan is ready to fight a war against India if India does not stop violations and obstruction of water flow’).

Pakistan wants the resumption of the all encompassing Composite Dialogue, but India is moving cautiously for now and wants to test the water before going for full fledged engagement that can address other bilateral disputes, including terrorism.

Posted by Animesh Roul on February 4, 2010. Respond »

A brief introduction

While I have written a guest post for the Asia Security Initiative Blog in the past (see here), this is my first post as a regular contributer to the blog. Accordingly, I thought a brief introduction might be in order.

Since 2006 I have blogged about Japanese politics and foreign policy at the blog Observing Japan, and in more recent years I have been a regular contributer to the now (sadly) defunct Far Eastern Economic Review, the Wall Street Journal Asia, and Newsweek International, as well as occasionally commenting on Japanese political developments on television and radio programs. All of that is in addition to my “day” job as a doctoral student in political science at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

In my contributions to this blog I will be analyzing the changes afoot in Japan’s foreign policy, especially its relationship with the United States, its most important ally for the past half century, and its relationship with China, its most important trading partner. In some ways last year’s election of the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) was the catalyst for marked shifts in Japan’s foreign relations — most notably the dispute with the U.S. over the future of the Futenma air base in Okinawa — but in other ways the government of Prime Minister Hatoyama Yukio is building on a “rebalancing” of Japanese foreign policy that began even before the DPJ unseated the long-governing Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). Japan is in the early stages of a fundamental debate on its foreign policy that could result in greater distance from the U.S., although for social and economic reasons (not to mention strategic reasons) perhaps not too distant. In short, in my contributions here I hope to show how Japanese foreign policy making is shaped and constrained by domestic political factors.

With that as an introduction, I would like to link to this recent op-ed I wrote for the Wall Street Asia in which I discuss the consequences of a mayoral election in the small Okinawan city of Nago on the U.S.-Japan relationship.

Posted by Tobias Harris on February 2, 2010. Respond »

Obama to Indonesia and Then….?

This afternoon the White House announced that President Obama will travel to Indonesia in the second half of March.  Apart from the symbolic importance of visiting the largest Muslim-majority country in the world, which also happens to be his boyhood home,  Obama will join President Susilo Bambang Yudyhono for the formal launch of the US-Indonesia Comprehensive Partnership.  The Partnership is still a work in progress, but it is expected to focus on six areas of policy: expanding bilateral education and exchanges; regional democracy and reform; advancing cooperation on global climate change; trade and food security, investment and business, and bilateral security cooperation. It is not clear how many of the initial programs that undergird the partnership will be new.  Governments are sometimes given to pouring old wine into new bottles when they attempt to redefine a relationship, not least when heads of state are concerned.  However, even rearranging the elements of the current relationship may have merit, if it moves the perception of US-Indonesian relations beyond the recent past, when Congressional sanctions on the Indonesian military set the tone.

The other stops on Obama’s March trip will be an address to US service personnel on Guam, en route to Asia, and a visit to Australia to mark the 70th anniversary of US-Australian relations.  Beyond the ceremonial aspects of the visit, the Obama-Rudd agenda is expected to include the global economic recovery; clean energy and climate change; non-proliferation and Afghanistan.

As with all announcements of Presidential trips, this one unleashes speculation on the administration’s priorities in the region and future trips in Obama’s 2010 Asia itinerary. Presidential scheduling is an intensely political process and one that can spark bureaucratic rivalry as well.  In November Obama will travel to Yokohama for the APEC Leaders Meeting, and there are strong expectations that he will include Beijing and Seoul in the trip as well.  The hope that Obama will travel to India this year, on the heels of Prime Minister Singh’s state visit last November, is palpable in Washington’s South Asian affairs community, but no dates have been announced as yet

Southeast Asia specialists and policymakers are left with a greater number of unanswered questions.  Obama’s trip to Indonesia will mark his second visit to a Southeast Asian maritime state that has significant security relations with the United States but is not a treaty ally (the first being Singapore for the APEC meeting last November).  Are Thailand and the Philippines, Washington’s two treaty allies in the region, still central to US security in Southeast Asia?  Is it prudent to visit the Philippines in an election year or Thailand while the political crisis continues, albeit at a calmer level than at any time since 2006?  What of Vietnam’s invitation to Obama to visit Hanoi this year for the second round of the US-ASEAN Summit?  Southeast Asia watchers will analyze the venue for that meeting to determine if the administration is committed to a permanent US-ASEAN summit process or will simply rely on convenience, piggybacking meetings on the backs of larger regional summits where possible. 

With one puzzle piece in place, jockeying for the others will only intensify. 

Reader Commentary by Jim Wallar:

Agree with the puzzle analogy—but a three dimensional one with bilateral and regional elements. China, Japan, Korea, and India play both dimensions. The President could do so by driving twenty minutes from the Presidential Place in Jakarat to the ASEAN Secretariat.  Reaching out to 10 countries in one visit is very elegant. Would this detract from the bilateral event? Would this highlight Indonesia’s leadership in ASEAN? There is certain to be debates in the planning circles. Under the US-ASEAN Partnership the USG demonstrated its innovation by appointing the first Ambassador to ASEAN.  A Head of State visit to ASEAN would again demonstrate US statesmanship. The other pieces of the puzzle remain in play, but its multidimensional character would become even more interesting.

Response by Catherin Dalpino:

I agree that Obama should and easily could visit the ASEAN Secretariat when he is in Jakarta - I believe that would make him the first US President to do so and would build on Secretary Clinton’s visit to the Secretariat when she visited Jakarta in 2009.  ASEAN Secretary General Surin Pitsuwan is scheduled to visit Washington in mid-February, and this is something he might bring up in his discussions with the administration, although I would not be surprised to hear that it was already in the works.

It would be more complicated to organize a second round of the US-ASEAN Summit at the Secretariat, however.  It might be interpreted as a slight to Vietnam, the 2010 ASEAN Chair, although Hanoi could certainly chair the Summit at the Secretariat, underscoring that it was being held on ASEAN “territory.”. Indeed, in December 2008 an ASEAN Summit was held in Jakarta although Thailand was the ASEAN chair that year with Bangkok chairing the meeting.  With Thailand having just emerged from the “yellow shirt” seizure of the Bangkok International Airport in November, it seemed prudent to hold the Summit elsewhere. 

These features to underscore an ASEAN rather than Indonesia-led meeting would be important.  Some ASEAN leaders are beginning to tire of US references to Indonesia’s potential leadership role in the regon.  But ASEAN leaders are pragmatic above all and want most to see the summit process with the United States become a regular and permanent feature.  With careful choreography, they might agree to an unconventional arrangement to take advantage of Obama’s trip to Indonesia.

Posted by Catharin Dalpino on February 1, 2010. Respond »