Guest Post: Rohaiza Asi on Conflict Management in Indonesia

“Conflict Management Strategies in Indonesia: Comparing the experiences of Poso in Central Sulawesi, Maluku and West Kalimantan”

This guest post is by Rohaiza Asi, Project Officer, The Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, Singapore

In the third of a series of three workshops on internal conflict in Indonesia, the Centre of Humanitarian Dialogue has continued to explore common factors that generated brief but intense periods of ethnic and religious violence, examined the factors contributing to the outbreak of conflict and assessed conflict management efforts. The workshops were conducted jointly in the field with the Indonesian Institut Titian Perdamaian (ITP) and funded by the Government of Canada. Discussions were held in Pontianak, West Kalimantan on “Conflict Management Strategies in Indonesia, comparing the experiences of Poso in Central Sulawesi, Maluku and West Kalimantan.”

The discussion on west Kalimantan was held in February. Participants came from the Dayak community in Pontianak and Sambas, Madurese as well as Melayu settlers. Several government officials were also present.

Overview of the West Kalimantan Conflict

In the years before the fall of Soeharto, ethno-nationalist sentiments ran high and indigenous communities demanded for greater control over local territories. Fault lines between the indigenous Dayak, Malay and the Madurese settlers had already emerged by then. But the end of the New Order regime and the opening up of political space in Indonesia allowed for the expression of violent contestation.

In December 1996, at a concert in Sanggau Ledo, a group of Madurese youth injured two Dayaks in a fight over a previous dispute involving a girl. Rumours spread that the two Dayaks had been killed when in fact, they were not. This led to revenge motivated acts by the Dayaks as they burned hundreds of Madurese homes, markets and property over the next two weeks. The Madurese retaliated with more violence. In February 1997, the Dayaks engaged in a traditional ritual of passing the ‘red bowl’ (of chicken blood) from village to village to invite these villages to join in the war. This let to escalation of conflict and by April 1997, an estimated 500 Madurese perished.

In 1999, violence started again, this time in Sambas, between Malays and Madurese. Again, the violence was triggered by petty incidents between the youths of both communities. Dayaks soon joined in the conflict. During this period of fighting, an estimated of 200 casualties were reported although unofficial estimates were much higher. As the conflict raged, many Madurese fled to Pontianak as well as to Madura and East Java. By the year 2000, as many as 50,000 Madurese had been displaced. To date, most Madurese from Sambas have not returned and have chosen to resettle in or near Pontianak, the provincial capital.

The violent conflict that erupted in west Kalimantan centred mainly on competition over resources, transmigration and ethnic stereotypes particularly targeted against the Madurese. Policies implemented during the New Order regime had also contributed to some of the problems in the region. Laws implemented by the central government in the 1970s affected the status of land in Kalimantan and gave plenty of logging concessions to foreign companies. In addition, the Dayaks perceived government policies pertaining to land, forest and other economic activities as favouring the Madurese.

Conflict Management in Sambas

Government approaches to conflict management adopted a security approach, relocation of IDPs and development as well as reconciliation between the conflicting parties.

The government’s approach to the management of IDPs has mainly been characterised by relocation. This includes building new resettlement homes and facilities for the IDP community and disbursing 5 million rupiah to others to rebuild their houses. However, in many cases, living condition is reported to be dismal and in some instances, the relocation of these IDPs has caused unhappiness and tension with surrounding host communities.

Participants in the discussion commonly criticized the government’s approach to reconciliation, blaming the lack of political will. Participants claimed that reconciliation has been more successful in central Kalimantan due to the efforts of the local government. In central Kalimantan, local regulations or perda has been implemented specifically pertaining to the management of IDPs. Perda No. 9/2001 states that the return of IDPs is based on the equal rights of citizen to live together in peace, and there should be respect of local customs or adat. The regulation further states that IDPs must re-register with local authorities in order to be considered for repatriation and they must be able to produce a previous ID card and proof of home ownership.

Overall, reconciliation remains the main challenge in the district of Sambas. The majority of the Dayak community remain resistant to the return of the Madurese to Sambas. It is felt that persistent segregation between the different ethnic groups in west Kalimantan that existed even prior to the outbreak of the conflict in 1999 has strengthened the prevalent stereotypes within the community. As communication and interaction between the Dayak and the Madurese has been minimal, this has reinforced prejudice. Additionally, reconciliation efforts undertaken by the local government, community leaders and NGOs have been ineffective as most tended to be symbolic and not designed to address the issue of distrust between the two communities.

Participants also attributed the failure of reconciliation to the absence of an influential and charismatic leader on both sides to lead the reconciliation process. Moreover in the west Kalimantan context, adat or tradition no longer occupies an important position and hence the historical role of the adat leader as the enforcer of social harmony is no longer applicable.

Another common claim throughout the workshop was that local government does not possess a clear understanding and conceptualisation of peacemaking and peacebuilding. Throughout the conflict, the government tended to rely heavily on security measures and took on a purely developmental approach thereafter. Moreover, the concept of peace remains problematic in the local context. For the Dayak and Malay in Sambas, to accept peace means to accept the return of the Madurese. The rejection of the Madurese also stems from personal interest that resulted over the issue of land ownership and occupation. It was common to hear stories of a Madurese IDP who returned to Sambas to negotiate the sale of his land but he was murdered and his body was not returned to his relatives.

Complementing the conflict management efforts of the local government are NGOs that are active in programs for economic rehabilitation and empowerment, capacity building with IDPs, and trauma recovery involving children. Several NGOs have also played important roles in bridging communication between ethnic groups but generally, it appears that many local NGOs still work along ethnic lines.

Drawing comparisons across conflicts

Looking across the Sambas, Ambon and Poso conflicts, theer are interesting areas of common ground. Tensions built up during the New Order era which centred mainly on competition over economic resources as a result of transmigration. In the case of Ambon and Poso, transmigration altered the religious balance. With the end of the New Order era, these tensions rose to the fore erupted into violence. In Ambon and Poso, the conflicts were later framed around religious issues. Churches and mosques were destroyed and burnt. To the contrary, the west Kalimantan conflict was framed around ethnic issues and “not a single mosque was destroyed during the conflict,” according to participants.

Interestingly, youths have been widely reported as the trigger to conflict in the three areas. The violence in Poso was allegedly triggered by a seemingly petty incident that took place on Christmas Eve in 1998, involving fighting between a Christian and Muslim youth in which the latter was subsequently stabbed. In the Sambas conflict, violence was triggered by a series of petty incidents involving youths from the Madura, Malay and Dayak community. This trend can be attributed to the low level of education and widespread unemployment. As there is no channel for these youths to direct their energy, they became vulnerable to provocation and street fights. Hence, we have often heard in these workshop discussions that it is important to ensure that the youth receive the necessary education and assistance on employment as they are often the troublemakers.

Across the three workshops, participants blamed those with political interests for inciting the conflict. However, in the case of Sambas the role of external provocateurs was less clear although participants questioned the real motive behind heavy mobilisation of troops from other parts of Indonesia.

It appears that throughout the three conflicts, the widespread atrocities and human rights abuses committed by the military instilled a sense of awareness among locals that they have been used to achieve a greater political purpose. Whether true or not, this belief helped unite local communities in a search for peace.

In all three conflicts, the government’s policy was dominated by a security approach. There was heavy troop presence in all three locations. Participants from the three workshops were generally very critical of the role of the security forces. There were repeated claims that the security forces were not the neutral party they were supposed to be in diffusing the violence. In Ambon and Poso, military and police took sides in the fighting between the Christians and Muslims and often, only served to worsen the situation.

There were numerous rumours that the security forces had supply weapons to the conflicting parties and were responsible for allowing Laskar Jihad into Ambon and Poso. In Sambas, the security forces also came under much criticism by the different ethnic groups for protecting the other and for having a hand in the killing of the Madurese. Later, the strong intervention of the central government, complemented by peacemaking efforts at the grassroots level, paved the way for the Malino I Declaration in Poso and the Manilo II Agreement in Ambon. Strong intervention by the central government and a vibrant civil society were both lacking in Sambas during the conflict. According to a local government representative, it was hard to intervene without the local government being accused of bias.

Another common claim throughout the three areas, in the aftermath of the conflict, was the government’s emphasis on development and rebuilding of infrastructures at the expense of reconciliation and reintegration of the conflicting parties. As mentioned in both the Ambon and Poso workshops, the local government is inclined to the development approach as success is easier to measure in material terms. However, sometimes resources are not put to optimal use due to lack of coordination between the district and provincial government as well as corruption.

On IDPs, local governments are more inclined to adopt relocation measures as opposed to reconciliation. In the case of Ambon, for instance, relocation had the undesired effect of strengthening segregation as relocation settlement for IDPs created Muslim or Christian enclaves whereas before the communities were more integrated. Similarly in west Kalimantan, Madurese IDP resettlement contributed to segregation, resulting in minimal communication between the Madurese and surrounding communities.

On reconciliation, Ambon and Poso have made more progress than Sambas where prejudice and stereotypes remain very strong. While traditional practices and values such as pela gandong and sintuwu maruso have played a key role in preserving harmonious relations in Maluku and Poso respectively, discussions on the role of adat seem to be lacking in the context of Sambas as the role of adat has significantly weakened. Participants, however, pointed out that traditional mechanism of conflict resolution and reconciliation has much to offer and these practices should be revitalised in west Kalimantan.

Recommendations

The discussion in Pontianak produced two principal recommendations. The first is to revitalise traditional values (kearifan lokal). Many cultural practices carry messages of peace but these practices have broken down due to modernisation. For instance, adat Pamabang was utilised in the aftermath of the 1997 conflict in Sanggau Ledo. Adat Pamabang is a ritual that originates from the Dayak community that is observed by conflicting parties when they agree on a ceasefire. This ritual was carried out for two weeks and is meant to cleanse the earth from evils. Participants also recommended the implementation of regional regulation or perda on the role of these traditions.

The second recommendation involved the creation of a communication forum to encourage and foster interaction between the different ethnic groups. The forum can be led by influential figures of different ethnicity. Participants agreed that manifestation of ethnic stereotypes occurred over time due to lack of interaction between the ethnic groups.

A participant from the local government suggested inviting the Madurese and Dayak to an annual event in Pontianak, the ‘Festival Budaya Bumi Khatulistiwa,’ publicise the event and carefully ensure that the two ethnic groups mingle and interact with one another. Such an orchestrated event could be the stepping stone to re-establishing communication between the two sides that have broken down and with the hope that it will gradually build trust.

Conclusion

In contrast to the Ambon and Poso workhops, recommendations were less forthcoming in the discussions of the Sambas conflict. But there was clear consensus that reconciliation remains a key problem to date. Ethnic stereotype and prejudice have been cited as the main obstacle to reconciliation between the Madurese and Dayak in Sambas. Peace is fragile as it rests on the notion that the Madurese will not return to Sambas.

Posted by Matthew Shannon Stumpf on March 11, 2010. Respond »

Jummas of CHTs: Caught Between Accord and Discord

Violent clashes erupted between ethnic Jumma (largely Buddhists) minorities and Bengali settlers in the Khagrachhari and Rangamati districts in Chittagong Hill between 19-23 February, resulting in at least four deaths. Hundreds have reportedly been injured or displaced. Reports claim that thousands of indigenous people were made homeless after arsonists supported by Bangladeshi soldiers burned down nearly 600 Jamma buildings, including residential houses, temples, churches and schools, during the violence. However, the Bangladeshi government has denied any involvement, direct or indirect, in the recent violence.

Now that a tenuous peace has returned to Bangladesh’s tribal Chittagong Hill Tracts region following clashes between tribes and settlers in violence that some say was encouraged by the military, all eyes are now on how Dhaka will respond. I published a report on this issue titled “Bangladesh Under Fire over Tribal Violence” at ISN Security Watch, Zurich, with views from couple of expert observers of the situation.

For a brief background, read ASI Blog report, “Ethnic Violence Grips Bangladesh”, February 24, 2010.

Here is the transcript of my interview with Sophie Grig, senior campaigner with Survival International. The London-based Survival International advocates for tribal rights worldwide and has been long monitoring the CHT situation. Your (ASI Blog readers) Comments are very welcome.

Q1- Chittagong Hill Tracts of Bangladesh have witnessed violence recently. How do you describe this episodic ethnic violence that surfaced in the area between Bengali settlers and Jumma Hill people?

Sadly, the recent violence comes as no surprise to those who are following the situation in the Chittagong Hill Tracts. Tension had been building up in the Sajek region for some time, with settlers, supported by the soldiers, taking land from the Jumma tribal people. The history of conflict between the two groups means that any incident can spark great tensions which can rapidly get out of hand. As happened here, once the violence was triggered, settlers have taken the opportunity to burn down the houses of innocent Jumma villagers. Because the army supports and encourages the settlers, they are able to act without restraint. Soldiers have been involved in gross human rights violations in the CHT, with impunity, for many years. It is essential that those responsible for the shooting of Jumma people are brought to justice and a full impartial investigation should take place into the whole incident. Until the Jummas have their land rights fully recognized and the CHT is demilitarized (including the removal of all the temporary military camps, as agreed in the Peace Accord), the Jumma people will not be able to feel safe on their own land.

Q2- CHTs Peace Accord is 12 years old and yet to be implemented in real terms. Is there a lack of political will or vested interest playing a larger game here? 

I think for many years there was a absence of much needed ‘political will’ to implement the peace accord. Couple of years back, there have been many positive signs but nothing although it is not happening fast enough. I also believe that there are vested interests in the CHT, within the army and the settler communities, who do not want the accord to be implemented and who do not want the military to lose their control in the region. Survival is calling on the government to fully implement the CHT peace accord and to ensure that all those responsible for attacks against the Jumma people are brought to justice.

Q3- Do you think that there will be reemergence armed groups in CHTs to protect minority rights, especially in the face of alleged military repressions?

I hope that this won’t be the case, and that this recent violence will have helped those within the Jumma community, who are divided about how best to push for peace in their region, to unite and work together for the rights of all Jummas.

Q4- Any recommendations for the Dhaka authority?

It is important for the Jummas to regain trust in the Government after these brutal attacks. Therefore, it is essential that there should be a full, independent investigation into the recent events and the role army played there. Those responsible for this atrocity must be brought to justice. While the army, and settlers, are seen to be able to kill and destroy with such impunity, the Jummas will never be safe on their own land. We call on the Bangladesh government to put an end to army violence in the CHT, withdraw the army camps, and fully implement the Peace Accord.

Posted by Animesh Roul on March 11, 2010. Respond »

Chinese Tone Down Tough Stance but Spats Remain

China is in its annual political season this month as the 3rd annual session of the 11th National People’s Congress (NPC), China’s top legislative body, is commencing in Beijing. Simultaneously, the Chinese People’s Consultative Conference (CPPCC), part of Chinese Communist Party (CPC)-sponsored “one party rule but multiple-parties collaborating system,” is also entering session. This political season is vividly named “lianghui” (two conferences ). On the sidelines of the “two conferences,” all cabinet members are supposed to hold press conferences stating their policy objectives and taking Q & As in public, one after another on a daily basis.

March 7’s protagonist for NPC daily press conferences was Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi, a seasoned Chinese diplomat and former Chinese Ambassador to the United States. Due to China-US spats over arms sales to Taiwan, President Obama’s meeting with the Dalai Lama, and plenty of trade frictions and wrangling over currency, FM Yang’s press conference drew enormous attention. His background of being an “America hand” in China adds to the public’s curiosity over his possibly refreshed explanation of Beijing’s U.S. policy at this pivotal moment. Additionally, his statement was simply about international concern on Beijing’s expected reaction to a US-circulated draft seeking to impose new sanctions on Teheran. Washington made up its mind to take action vis-à-vis Iran in the UN Security Council, and Beijing has been an important target country in the American diplomatic effort to amass international support. Deputy Secretary of State Jim Steinberg concluded a “quiet” visit to Beijing on March 4. FM Yang’s commentary on China’s Iran policy is a real footnote to Mr. Steinberg’s recent visit.

Unsurprisingly, FM Yang focuses his statement squarely on China-US relations. First of all, he refuses any accusation of a “tough” Chinese response by declaring the suspension of mil-to-mil exchange and proposing sanctions against American companies involved in arms sales to Taiwan. “We stick to our principles, which is totally different from being tough,” FM Yang stresses. “It has always been the mission for China’s diplomacy to defend China’s sovereignty, security and development interests, while promoting world peace and development.”  He continued, asking: “Where are justice and principles if one views the actions taken by a country to defend its core interests and dignity as being ‘tough’, and takes for granted actions infringing the interests of others?” In contrast to a Chinese spokesman’s open firing at the U.S. one or two months ago, obviously, Yang’s remark on this nationally live televised occasion sounds very defensive rather than “offensive.” This signals Beijing’s intention that “turbulence” might pass on already, and it would like to see the fire extinguished, with both countries resolving to renew a productive, higher-level dialogue. It’s also a positive sign that Chinese President Hu Jintao might attend the nuclear-free summit in April, which has been an important part of President Obama’s nuclear-free-world diplomatic campaign.

Yet, FM Yang does not forget to keep the blame on the White House for the spats. He continues that the improvement of China-US lies with Washington. His point offers a clue that Beijing hasn’t decided completely yet if President Hu would pay a state visit to the US while he is in New York to attend the nuclear summit meeting. In fact, China has been highly aware of the upcoming Treasury Report about the Chinese government’s role in Chinese currency. Beijing is admittedly set to fire back and even risk revoking President Hu’s planned visit if the US Treasury Report proclaims that Beijing is unfairly manipulating the Chinese Yuan. The most damaging charge that could come from the United States would follow on some U.S. government officials’ views that the Chinese government keeps the yuan undervalued to boost Chinese exports. Therefore, FM Yang’s remark is a reminder of the vulnerability of Beijing-Washington relationship for the time being. Associated with Chinese Central Bank chief Mr. Zhou Xiao Chuan’s proposition that the value of the Chinese Yuan would be unlikely to rise on 6 March 2010 as long as main economies remain mired in slow growth, no one could be blindly optimistic about the prospects of closer China-US cooperation in 2010.

In fact, Beijing’s focus has turned to the growing economic and trading frictions between China and the US. Without effective and appropriate management of their economic and trading disputes, the base of stable and healthy ties between Beijing and Washington will be truly rocky and bumpy. Despite the proposed “core interests” of Taiwan and Tibet, economic and trading link across the Pacific Ocean have become more than “core.” Beijing understands that there are both “structural” matters—US will not abandon its strategic interest in East Asia and its concern for human rights and religious freedom, and at the same time, China will not stop its protesting against the US on these issues. The past two decades have proven that both the sides are able to keep those disputes in check as long as neither acts as a “spoiler” seeking to take advantage of two matters. But Beijing-Washington economic ties have been a glue to keep both parties together. Now they will ominously keep both powers apart?
The Iran issue has been overshadowed by growing China-US economic disputes. Beijing has a big oil stake at Tehran, and therefore is opposed to a hardball policy, including tougher sanctions aimed at Iran’s economy, to prevent from Tehran’s nuclear ambition. Despite the low likeliness of Beijing’s veto to any US-proposed anti-Iran sanctions act in the coming months, FM Yang does not alter his persistent tone on March 7. He unambiguously de-emphasizes the urgency of imposing new sanctions on Iran, and instead calls for committed negotiations. For this moment, to bring President Obama and President Hu to talk in person as soon as possible might be the best tack to navigate through the stormy water of China-US relations.

Posted by Zhu Feng on March 9, 2010. Respond »

Celebrating Women’s Day: What Does the UN Have to Say?

Asia-Pacific Human Development Report 2010 has been launched today (March 8, 2010) which coincided with the International Women’s Day. Quite well timed, the report on gender equality titled “Power, Voice and Rights: A Turning point for Gender Equality in Asia and The Pacific” depicts the status of women and the state of affairs across Asia pacific.

The report says, nearly 100 million women across Asia have disappeared because of a huge and growing gender gap that has fatally deprived them of access to health care and food and has led to widespread abortions of female fetuses. China and India each account for about 43 million of those “missing” women, while Pakistan accounts for 6.1 million and South Korea for 200,000.

South Asia often comes in second worst in the world in gender equality measures, just above sub-Saharan Africa, while East Asia often fares better in health, education, and employment. Almost half the adult women in South Asia are illiterate –the world’s worst performance–while East Asian and Pacific women’s literacy rates are above the global average.  South Asian women can expect to die five years earlier than their men. And more women die in childbirth there ―500 for every 100,000 live births— than in any other part of the world except sub-Saharan Africa.

Recommendations:
The following eight recommendations summarize broad directions for action across the three areas (Report focuses on three key areas — economic power, political decision-making and legal rights)  covered in the Report.

1. Make international commitments a reality.

Countries should ratify and use international conventions that promote human rights, respect for diversity and equality for all. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides a foundation that was made specific to gender equality in CEDAW (Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women). Particular attention should be paid to removing the region’s high number of reservations to CEDAW, paving the way for bringing domestic legislation in line with it. Both protective and empowering measures should be integrated into policies and practices.

2. Craft economic policies to support gender equality.

Too often, the gender-blind nature of economic policy-making results in choices that deny women opportunities, even if they are not intended to do so. A more deliberate focus on gender and how it affects women’s economic options is required—particularly in targeting poverty interventions to provide equal opportunities for women and men. Governments should ensure that fiscal and monetary policies help unleash women’s leadership and entrepreneurship. Monetary policy can be attuned to be more supportive of inclusive growth and human development—for example, through directed lending to poor women for productive purposes. Fiscal policy should include gender-based budgeting, covering revenues and expenditures across all budget categories.

3. Make the content of education more gender equal.

Because education systems still perpetuate gender stereotypes, national and local governments should develop awareness of gender in such systems, such as through teacher training. Civil society groups and gender experts can be brought in to guide the assessment and development of textbooks and question materials that overtly enforce stereotypes or do so by omission. Schools should promote female leadership and active decision-making, in part, to provide positive role models to girls.

4. Boost political participation.

Legislatures,political parties and political leaders should recognize the importance of women’s political participation to democracy and equal citizenship. Special actions to boost the number and quality of female representatives and women in upper echelons of government might include quotas, political party reform, gender-orientation and capacity development. All these measures need to be
approached in the spirit of genuine change, avoiding tokenism or manipulation for political gain. National and sub-national political leaders should assure better gender balance in leadership across all aspects of crisis management, whether involving natural disasters, conflicts or a sustained economic downturn.

5. Pursue gender-equitable laws.

Parliaments can benefit from reforming gender discriminatory laws and making new ones where needed. This should include ironing out discrepancies between customary and formal laws that perpetuate discrimination, as well as gaps between laws and constitutional principles. Countries should have gender-specific constitutional provisions on equality and nondiscrimination. This will narrow the wide latitude of interpretation currently enjoyed by courts and law enforcement agencies. Legal systems should be subjected to an overall gender equality review of national legislation, as some countries have done, including for CEDAW compliance.

6. Address legal discrimination and close gaps between laws and legal practice.

The justice system should ensure that legal practices are consistent with laws on the books and that access to justice is broadly available. Professional training for lawyers, judges, magistrates and police should include an orientation around the needs of marginalized groups. Crimes against women should not be treated lightly.

7. Collect better data and strengthen capacity for gender analysis.

National statistical systems should strengthen capacities to collect, report and analyze sex-disaggregated data, especially in overlooked areas such as the prevalence of gender based violence and male-female gaps in asset ownership. Systematic and ongoing assessments should feed into policy efforts to close disparities.

8. Foster new attitudes.

Civil society, the media, academic institutions, religious organizations, businesses and other groups involved in shaping social attitudes should be enlisted in influencing them to support gender equality. Concrete advocacy tools can be developed and new channels of advocacy and communication explored. A strong push should be made to include men in the understanding of gender equality and steps to achieve it, recognizing their transformative role.

For a complete overview, Read Here.

For Sectionwise (Chapters), See Here.

For full Text (Approx 230 pages of text), Read Here

Posted by Animesh Roul on March 8, 2010. Respond »

Research Tools: Literature Reviews on Internal Conflicts in India and Indonesia

The HD Centre and its partners have released two literature reviews in support of their project “Comparative Perspectives on Conflict Management in Asia.” Both are available on the web site of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies in Singapore.

A review of material on conflict management in India, conducted in partnership with the Delhi Policy Group, focuses on conflicts in Kashmir and Manipur, as well as on the Naxalites. Read it here.

A review of material on conflict management in Indonesia, conducted in partnership with the Peace-Building Institute (Institut Titian Perdamaian) and the Indonesian Institute of Sciences (LIPI), focuses on Papua, Poso, Maluku and Indonesia more broadly. Read it here.

Posted by Matthew Shannon Stumpf on March 4, 2010. Respond »