Guest Post: Amy Searight on the Politics of Climate Change in Asia

The Politics of Climate Change in Asia

This is a guest post by Amy Searight, Adjunct Fellow at the Japan Chair of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and Adjunct Professor at the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University.

The comparison of climate change politics across Asia’s widely disparate countries has yielded some fascinating insights. Asia-Pacific countries divide roughly into two groups. The first group consists of more ambitious countries, with governments willing and able to take a forward leaning stance on climate change policies, including Korea, Japan, Indonesia, and to some extent Australia under the Labor government. The other group includes those countries facing severe domestic constraints and reluctant to take the lead in climate change policy, such as China, India, and the United States. 

Interestingly, this grouping does not break down along lines of advanced versus emerging market economies or between more and less economically developed countries. The analyses of these scholars highlighted the ways in which countries define their interests differently and uniquely, depending on perception of opportunities at the international level, as well as the domestic political situation faced by governments at home.

One common strategic constraint facing all countries in international collaboration on climate change is the collective action dilemma. No country wants to assume an unfair burden by contributing more than their “fair share” of carbon reductions. This common problem is made more acute by concerns over competitiveness and carbon leakage – the risk that self-imposed limits on carbon emissions will drive up local industrial costs higher than countries (notably China) that insist on less stringent restrictions.  All countries want to avoid a “suckers payoff” in the strategic game of climate change cooperation.

And yet, despite this common strategic dilemma, the politics of climate change policy are playing out quite differently across these countries. Several key Asian governments have sought to use climate change to their domestic and international advantage. Rather than focusing on costs and constraints, these governments are framing the issue as one of opportunities. Korea and Japan, for example, are both seeking to take leading roles in global efforts to mitigate climate change. The current governments in both countries see several advantages to positioning themselves as “green leaders.” First, playing a lead and constructive role in global talks on climate change is an opportunity to boost international stature and augment their “soft power” by being seen as “green powers.” Second, both countries see first-mover advantages in restructuring their economies to promote green technologies. Despite substantial opposition from industry in both countries, the governments of President Lee in Korea and the Prime Minister Hatoyama in Japan are able to frame their ambitious environmental agendas in ways that are sustaining broad public support.

Another comparatively forward leaning country is Indonesia. President Yudhoyono has proposed ambitious unilateral reduction targets for emissions, and has offered even higher reductions with international support. Like Korea, Indonesia sees an opportunity to play a leading role in international climate change discussions as a “bridge” between diverse countries, as a developing country, an oil producer, and an archipelago highly vulnerable to the impacts of climate change. The government is also motivated by the prospect of gaining international financial support, as well as the comparatively low cost of mitigation policies that would come from tackling the problems of deforestation, forest fires and peatland degradation, which contribute more than half of Indonesia’s greenhouse gas emissions.

As these examples illustrate, the comparison of these seven Asia-Pacific countries suggest that variables on both the international and domestic levels are central to explaining national variation in climate change politics. In addition to the international opportunities and constraints discussed above, the key domestic political variables include:

—The government:  how does the current government view climate change policies in terms of partisan electoral considerations?  Are leaders personally involved in and committed to policy outcomes?  Are bureaucratic rivalries shaping policies in positive or negative ways? 

—Opposition:  Are groups opposed to climate change policies organized and coherent, or fragmented?  Is there a strong political party who stands against the government on the issue?  Is the business community unified in opposition to climate change, or is it divided by competing interests?

—The broad public debate over climate change:  Where does public opinion stand on the issue of global warming and climate change?  How much acceptance vs. skepticism of scientific beliefs on climate change is expressed by the public?  Is the question of cost (in monetary terms) clearly defined in public discussion over climate change policies?  To what extent are concerns about competitiveness and carbon leakage the focus of public debate?  How do cultural understandings and environmental features of each country shape the public debate?

Further comparative analysis on these questions will yield additional insights into the likely trajectories of climate change policies in key Asian nations.  These in turn may help identify possible roadblocks to international efforts on climate change, as well as suggest potential areas of cooperation on the global and regional level.

Through the Politics of Climate Change in Asia project, CSIS is looking in-depth at how the Asia-Pacific region can work together to address the challenges of climate change, energy insecurity, and humanitarian crises in the years ahead.  As part of this initiative, CSIS held a roundtable on the Politics of Climate Change in Asia during the brief lull between two major snowstorms that hit Washington D.C. in February.  Scholars drawn from across the Asia-Pacific region braved the blizzard-like travel conditions and gathered at CSIS to discuss papers analyzing the domestic and international politics shaping the emerging perspectives and policies on climate change in their respective countries.  The scholars included Kiyoaki Aburaki (writing on Japan); Malcolm Cook (Australia); Prem Shankar Jha (India); Sarah Ladislaw (the United States); Wonhyuk Lim (Korea); Agus P. Sari (Indonesia); and Zhu Feng (China), along with CSIS scholars and a range of other experts on climate change and regional politics.  To learn more, visit the CSIS Asian Regionalism page. 

Posted by Matthew Shannon Stumpf on March 17, 2010. Respond »

Chinese Tone Down Tough Stance but Spats Remain

China is in its annual political season this month as the 3rd annual session of the 11th National People’s Congress (NPC), China’s top legislative body, is commencing in Beijing. Simultaneously, the Chinese People’s Consultative Conference (CPPCC), part of Chinese Communist Party (CPC)-sponsored “one party rule but multiple-parties collaborating system,” is also entering session. This political season is vividly named “lianghui” (two conferences ). On the sidelines of the “two conferences,” all cabinet members are supposed to hold press conferences stating their policy objectives and taking Q & As in public, one after another on a daily basis.

March 7’s protagonist for NPC daily press conferences was Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi, a seasoned Chinese diplomat and former Chinese Ambassador to the United States. Due to China-US spats over arms sales to Taiwan, President Obama’s meeting with the Dalai Lama, and plenty of trade frictions and wrangling over currency, FM Yang’s press conference drew enormous attention. His background of being an “America hand” in China adds to the public’s curiosity over his possibly refreshed explanation of Beijing’s U.S. policy at this pivotal moment. Additionally, his statement was simply about international concern on Beijing’s expected reaction to a US-circulated draft seeking to impose new sanctions on Teheran. Washington made up its mind to take action vis-à-vis Iran in the UN Security Council, and Beijing has been an important target country in the American diplomatic effort to amass international support. Deputy Secretary of State Jim Steinberg concluded a “quiet” visit to Beijing on March 4. FM Yang’s commentary on China’s Iran policy is a real footnote to Mr. Steinberg’s recent visit.

Unsurprisingly, FM Yang focuses his statement squarely on China-US relations. First of all, he refuses any accusation of a “tough” Chinese response by declaring the suspension of mil-to-mil exchange and proposing sanctions against American companies involved in arms sales to Taiwan. “We stick to our principles, which is totally different from being tough,” FM Yang stresses. “It has always been the mission for China’s diplomacy to defend China’s sovereignty, security and development interests, while promoting world peace and development.”  He continued, asking: “Where are justice and principles if one views the actions taken by a country to defend its core interests and dignity as being ‘tough’, and takes for granted actions infringing the interests of others?” In contrast to a Chinese spokesman’s open firing at the U.S. one or two months ago, obviously, Yang’s remark on this nationally live televised occasion sounds very defensive rather than “offensive.” This signals Beijing’s intention that “turbulence” might pass on already, and it would like to see the fire extinguished, with both countries resolving to renew a productive, higher-level dialogue. It’s also a positive sign that Chinese President Hu Jintao might attend the nuclear-free summit in April, which has been an important part of President Obama’s nuclear-free-world diplomatic campaign.

Yet, FM Yang does not forget to keep the blame on the White House for the spats. He continues that the improvement of China-US lies with Washington. His point offers a clue that Beijing hasn’t decided completely yet if President Hu would pay a state visit to the US while he is in New York to attend the nuclear summit meeting. In fact, China has been highly aware of the upcoming Treasury Report about the Chinese government’s role in Chinese currency. Beijing is admittedly set to fire back and even risk revoking President Hu’s planned visit if the US Treasury Report proclaims that Beijing is unfairly manipulating the Chinese Yuan. The most damaging charge that could come from the United States would follow on some U.S. government officials’ views that the Chinese government keeps the yuan undervalued to boost Chinese exports. Therefore, FM Yang’s remark is a reminder of the vulnerability of Beijing-Washington relationship for the time being. Associated with Chinese Central Bank chief Mr. Zhou Xiao Chuan’s proposition that the value of the Chinese Yuan would be unlikely to rise on 6 March 2010 as long as main economies remain mired in slow growth, no one could be blindly optimistic about the prospects of closer China-US cooperation in 2010.

In fact, Beijing’s focus has turned to the growing economic and trading frictions between China and the US. Without effective and appropriate management of their economic and trading disputes, the base of stable and healthy ties between Beijing and Washington will be truly rocky and bumpy. Despite the proposed “core interests” of Taiwan and Tibet, economic and trading link across the Pacific Ocean have become more than “core.” Beijing understands that there are both “structural” matters—US will not abandon its strategic interest in East Asia and its concern for human rights and religious freedom, and at the same time, China will not stop its protesting against the US on these issues. The past two decades have proven that both the sides are able to keep those disputes in check as long as neither acts as a “spoiler” seeking to take advantage of two matters. But Beijing-Washington economic ties have been a glue to keep both parties together. Now they will ominously keep both powers apart?
The Iran issue has been overshadowed by growing China-US economic disputes. Beijing has a big oil stake at Tehran, and therefore is opposed to a hardball policy, including tougher sanctions aimed at Iran’s economy, to prevent from Tehran’s nuclear ambition. Despite the low likeliness of Beijing’s veto to any US-proposed anti-Iran sanctions act in the coming months, FM Yang does not alter his persistent tone on March 7. He unambiguously de-emphasizes the urgency of imposing new sanctions on Iran, and instead calls for committed negotiations. For this moment, to bring President Obama and President Hu to talk in person as soon as possible might be the best tack to navigate through the stormy water of China-US relations.

Posted by Zhu Feng on March 9, 2010. Respond »

ASI Blog in the News: Catharin Dalpino Testifies on China’s Activities in Southeast Asia

Catharin Dalpino, who also blogs here at the Asia Security Initiative Blog, testified February 4 before the U.S.-China Economic Economic and Security Review Commission on “China’s Activities in Southeast Asia and the Implications for U.S. Interests.”

She makes six recommendations:

1. Commit to an annual US-ASEAN Summit, and use it as a vehicle to bring the President of the United States to Southeast Asia once a year.
2. Reassure Southeast Asians that the United States will not decrease its presence in the South China Sea. 
3. Press Beijing to become part of the Mekong River Commission, which would help legitimate discussion and action to remediate the environmental, human health and employment impacts of developments on the Mekong. 
4. Address the drift in US-Thai relations with a dialogue process to reinvigorate the alliance and lower tensions over specific issues.
5. Let the new engagement policy with Burma play out in the fullness of time. 
6. Consider the benefits of legislation introduced to extend trade preferences to Asian Least Developed Countries, similar to those given to African and Caribbean countries.

Read the entire testimony here.

Posted by Matthew Shannon Stumpf on February 8, 2010. Respond »

Shanghai Jiaotong University January 2010 CPSIS Letter Now Available

The January 2010 edition of CPSIS Letter by Shanghai Center for RimPac Strategic and International Studies (CPSIS) and Center for RimPac Studies at Shanghai Jiaotong University (CPSSJTU) is now available. It features writings by Center experts on U.S. arms sales to Taiwan and reflections on climate change negotiations.

Read it here.

Posted by Matthew Shannon Stumpf on February 1, 2010. Respond »

New EAI Issue Briefing on the Prospects for Change in China’s DPRK Policy

In the Latest EAI Issue Briefing, “Prospects for Change in the Beijing-Pyongyang Nexus,” Sukhee Han of Yonsei University studies the evolution of China’s policy toward North Korea.

He concludes:

In the wake of the second nuclear test, the voices supporting a tougher stance on North Korea dominated the Chinese academia and media. The Chinese scholars arguing for a harder line are called the “strategists.” In general, the Chinese media coverage of North Korea has become more permissive in recent years ...

Another case indicating the shift of Chinese public sentiment regarding North Korea can be found in the Global Times [Huanqiu shibao], a newspaper with nationalist views on international affairs. It conducted a survey of twenty experts on international affairs right after the second nuclear test and found that half of the respondents supported more severe sanctions against North Korea. It also found that 30 percent of the respondents believed that the Six-Party Talks had failed. Reflective of Chinese domestic trends, China watchers in Washington and Seoul cautiously support such potential changes of policy in China toward North Korea. The China watchers base their current conclusions on two factors. The first is China’s domestic change in sentiment against the North. As a Chinese scholar commented, the North Korean nuclear test was a “slap in the face.” Observers in China believe that their country has consistently supported and provided assistance to North Korea, but their benevolence has been returned with an unexpected betrayal. The second factor is that China, as a rising power in pursuit of superpower status, is less able to continue to support North Korea’s misdemeanors at the cost of international responsibility.

However, the prospects for a change in China’s policy change toward North Korea look dim at the moment. First, it is more important for China to maintain peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula than to denuclearize it. Although China has declared that (1) peace and stability and (2) denuclearization are the two most important goals of its policy toward the Korean Peninsula, China places a much higher priority on peace and stability. Second, it is true that there have been a growing number of North Korea experts arguing for China’s policy change toward North Korea, but their voices are still in the minority. In general, they are relatively young in age and low in status, and have limited opportunities to take part in the decision-making process. Third, if we review the strategists’ argument for policy change, we find that they are not actually intending to implement a fundamental policy change. The key to China’s policy change toward the North is whether China accepts the possibility of a North Korean regime collapse. But given the current situation, China would never allow the collapse of the Kim Jong-il regime.”

Read the entire briefing here and here.

Posted by Matthew Shannon Stumpf on January 13, 2010. Respond »