Guest Post: Amy Searight on the Politics of Climate Change in Asia

The Politics of Climate Change in Asia

This is a guest post by Amy Searight, Adjunct Fellow at the Japan Chair of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and Adjunct Professor at the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University.

The comparison of climate change politics across Asia’s widely disparate countries has yielded some fascinating insights. Asia-Pacific countries divide roughly into two groups. The first group consists of more ambitious countries, with governments willing and able to take a forward leaning stance on climate change policies, including Korea, Japan, Indonesia, and to some extent Australia under the Labor government. The other group includes those countries facing severe domestic constraints and reluctant to take the lead in climate change policy, such as China, India, and the United States. 

Interestingly, this grouping does not break down along lines of advanced versus emerging market economies or between more and less economically developed countries. The analyses of these scholars highlighted the ways in which countries define their interests differently and uniquely, depending on perception of opportunities at the international level, as well as the domestic political situation faced by governments at home.

One common strategic constraint facing all countries in international collaboration on climate change is the collective action dilemma. No country wants to assume an unfair burden by contributing more than their “fair share” of carbon reductions. This common problem is made more acute by concerns over competitiveness and carbon leakage – the risk that self-imposed limits on carbon emissions will drive up local industrial costs higher than countries (notably China) that insist on less stringent restrictions.  All countries want to avoid a “suckers payoff” in the strategic game of climate change cooperation.

And yet, despite this common strategic dilemma, the politics of climate change policy are playing out quite differently across these countries. Several key Asian governments have sought to use climate change to their domestic and international advantage. Rather than focusing on costs and constraints, these governments are framing the issue as one of opportunities. Korea and Japan, for example, are both seeking to take leading roles in global efforts to mitigate climate change. The current governments in both countries see several advantages to positioning themselves as “green leaders.” First, playing a lead and constructive role in global talks on climate change is an opportunity to boost international stature and augment their “soft power” by being seen as “green powers.” Second, both countries see first-mover advantages in restructuring their economies to promote green technologies. Despite substantial opposition from industry in both countries, the governments of President Lee in Korea and the Prime Minister Hatoyama in Japan are able to frame their ambitious environmental agendas in ways that are sustaining broad public support.

Another comparatively forward leaning country is Indonesia. President Yudhoyono has proposed ambitious unilateral reduction targets for emissions, and has offered even higher reductions with international support. Like Korea, Indonesia sees an opportunity to play a leading role in international climate change discussions as a “bridge” between diverse countries, as a developing country, an oil producer, and an archipelago highly vulnerable to the impacts of climate change. The government is also motivated by the prospect of gaining international financial support, as well as the comparatively low cost of mitigation policies that would come from tackling the problems of deforestation, forest fires and peatland degradation, which contribute more than half of Indonesia’s greenhouse gas emissions.

As these examples illustrate, the comparison of these seven Asia-Pacific countries suggest that variables on both the international and domestic levels are central to explaining national variation in climate change politics. In addition to the international opportunities and constraints discussed above, the key domestic political variables include:

—The government:  how does the current government view climate change policies in terms of partisan electoral considerations?  Are leaders personally involved in and committed to policy outcomes?  Are bureaucratic rivalries shaping policies in positive or negative ways? 

—Opposition:  Are groups opposed to climate change policies organized and coherent, or fragmented?  Is there a strong political party who stands against the government on the issue?  Is the business community unified in opposition to climate change, or is it divided by competing interests?

—The broad public debate over climate change:  Where does public opinion stand on the issue of global warming and climate change?  How much acceptance vs. skepticism of scientific beliefs on climate change is expressed by the public?  Is the question of cost (in monetary terms) clearly defined in public discussion over climate change policies?  To what extent are concerns about competitiveness and carbon leakage the focus of public debate?  How do cultural understandings and environmental features of each country shape the public debate?

Further comparative analysis on these questions will yield additional insights into the likely trajectories of climate change policies in key Asian nations.  These in turn may help identify possible roadblocks to international efforts on climate change, as well as suggest potential areas of cooperation on the global and regional level.

Through the Politics of Climate Change in Asia project, CSIS is looking in-depth at how the Asia-Pacific region can work together to address the challenges of climate change, energy insecurity, and humanitarian crises in the years ahead.  As part of this initiative, CSIS held a roundtable on the Politics of Climate Change in Asia during the brief lull between two major snowstorms that hit Washington D.C. in February.  Scholars drawn from across the Asia-Pacific region braved the blizzard-like travel conditions and gathered at CSIS to discuss papers analyzing the domestic and international politics shaping the emerging perspectives and policies on climate change in their respective countries.  The scholars included Kiyoaki Aburaki (writing on Japan); Malcolm Cook (Australia); Prem Shankar Jha (India); Sarah Ladislaw (the United States); Wonhyuk Lim (Korea); Agus P. Sari (Indonesia); and Zhu Feng (China), along with CSIS scholars and a range of other experts on climate change and regional politics.  To learn more, visit the CSIS Asian Regionalism page. 

Posted by Matthew Shannon Stumpf on March 17, 2010. Respond »

In the News: What Indonesia Can Teach Burma

Sydney Morning Herald Asia-Pacific editor Hamish McDonald writes on the potential impact of the upcoming visit of Indonesian Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa to Burma.

He writes:

An intriguing sidebar to the story of the Indonesian president’s visit to Australia this week has been the additional insight into Jakarta’s role in trying to solve South-East Asia’s biggest problem: the brutal grip of Burma’s military regime.

…

Indonesia’s inclusion in the Group of 20, which combines the major developed nations with the emerging economic powers and gave Jakarta’s leaders a taste of being at the centre of things during the global financial crisis, is causing its thinking to wander away from the ineffective ASEAN, to the alarm of other members not in the G20 themselves.

Under SBY, as the president is known, Indonesia is also taking more of a direct role in pressuring Burma’s generals towards democratic reform. Later this month, its Foreign Minister, Marty Natalegawa, is visiting Rangoon.

…

[Expert Jeff] Kingston says that the new political system of Than Shwe is indeed based on an Indonesian model.  Only it’s not the model of the present- day Indonesia under popularly-elected SBY, but that built by Suharto after he seized power in 1965-66 …

…

But present-day Burma is not the Indonesia of 40 years ago, Kingston warns. ‘‘The genie is already out of the bottle; holding and then ignoring the 1990 elections introduced dynamics in Burma that Suharto never had to cope with,’’ he said. Emulating a model that Indonesia has already discarded meets no acceptance among Burmese.

When he goes to Rangoon, Foreign Minister Natalegawa might turn up the volume a bit to make the point of reform more clear.

…

The big lesson is the risk of not moving far enough, early enough …”

Posted by Matthew Shannon Stumpf on March 15, 2010. Respond »

Guest Post: Rohaiza Asi on Conflict Management in Indonesia

“Conflict Management Strategies in Indonesia: Comparing the experiences of Poso in Central Sulawesi, Maluku and West Kalimantan”

This guest post is by Rohaiza Asi, Project Officer, The Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, Singapore

In the third of a series of three workshops on internal conflict in Indonesia, the Centre of Humanitarian Dialogue has continued to explore common factors that generated brief but intense periods of ethnic and religious violence, examined the factors contributing to the outbreak of conflict and assessed conflict management efforts. The workshops were conducted jointly in the field with the Indonesian Institut Titian Perdamaian (ITP) and funded by the Government of Canada. Discussions were held in Pontianak, West Kalimantan on “Conflict Management Strategies in Indonesia, comparing the experiences of Poso in Central Sulawesi, Maluku and West Kalimantan.”

The discussion on west Kalimantan was held in February. Participants came from the Dayak community in Pontianak and Sambas, Madurese as well as Melayu settlers. Several government officials were also present.

Overview of the West Kalimantan Conflict

In the years before the fall of Soeharto, ethno-nationalist sentiments ran high and indigenous communities demanded for greater control over local territories. Fault lines between the indigenous Dayak, Malay and the Madurese settlers had already emerged by then. But the end of the New Order regime and the opening up of political space in Indonesia allowed for the expression of violent contestation.

In December 1996, at a concert in Sanggau Ledo, a group of Madurese youth injured two Dayaks in a fight over a previous dispute involving a girl. Rumours spread that the two Dayaks had been killed when in fact, they were not. This led to revenge motivated acts by the Dayaks as they burned hundreds of Madurese homes, markets and property over the next two weeks. The Madurese retaliated with more violence. In February 1997, the Dayaks engaged in a traditional ritual of passing the ‘red bowl’ (of chicken blood) from village to village to invite these villages to join in the war. This let to escalation of conflict and by April 1997, an estimated 500 Madurese perished.

In 1999, violence started again, this time in Sambas, between Malays and Madurese. Again, the violence was triggered by petty incidents between the youths of both communities. Dayaks soon joined in the conflict. During this period of fighting, an estimated of 200 casualties were reported although unofficial estimates were much higher. As the conflict raged, many Madurese fled to Pontianak as well as to Madura and East Java. By the year 2000, as many as 50,000 Madurese had been displaced. To date, most Madurese from Sambas have not returned and have chosen to resettle in or near Pontianak, the provincial capital.

The violent conflict that erupted in west Kalimantan centred mainly on competition over resources, transmigration and ethnic stereotypes particularly targeted against the Madurese. Policies implemented during the New Order regime had also contributed to some of the problems in the region. Laws implemented by the central government in the 1970s affected the status of land in Kalimantan and gave plenty of logging concessions to foreign companies. In addition, the Dayaks perceived government policies pertaining to land, forest and other economic activities as favouring the Madurese.

Conflict Management in Sambas

Government approaches to conflict management adopted a security approach, relocation of IDPs and development as well as reconciliation between the conflicting parties.

The government’s approach to the management of IDPs has mainly been characterised by relocation. This includes building new resettlement homes and facilities for the IDP community and disbursing 5 million rupiah to others to rebuild their houses. However, in many cases, living condition is reported to be dismal and in some instances, the relocation of these IDPs has caused unhappiness and tension with surrounding host communities.

Participants in the discussion commonly criticized the government’s approach to reconciliation, blaming the lack of political will. Participants claimed that reconciliation has been more successful in central Kalimantan due to the efforts of the local government. In central Kalimantan, local regulations or perda has been implemented specifically pertaining to the management of IDPs. Perda No. 9/2001 states that the return of IDPs is based on the equal rights of citizen to live together in peace, and there should be respect of local customs or adat. The regulation further states that IDPs must re-register with local authorities in order to be considered for repatriation and they must be able to produce a previous ID card and proof of home ownership.

Overall, reconciliation remains the main challenge in the district of Sambas. The majority of the Dayak community remain resistant to the return of the Madurese to Sambas. It is felt that persistent segregation between the different ethnic groups in west Kalimantan that existed even prior to the outbreak of the conflict in 1999 has strengthened the prevalent stereotypes within the community. As communication and interaction between the Dayak and the Madurese has been minimal, this has reinforced prejudice. Additionally, reconciliation efforts undertaken by the local government, community leaders and NGOs have been ineffective as most tended to be symbolic and not designed to address the issue of distrust between the two communities.

Participants also attributed the failure of reconciliation to the absence of an influential and charismatic leader on both sides to lead the reconciliation process. Moreover in the west Kalimantan context, adat or tradition no longer occupies an important position and hence the historical role of the adat leader as the enforcer of social harmony is no longer applicable.

Another common claim throughout the workshop was that local government does not possess a clear understanding and conceptualisation of peacemaking and peacebuilding. Throughout the conflict, the government tended to rely heavily on security measures and took on a purely developmental approach thereafter. Moreover, the concept of peace remains problematic in the local context. For the Dayak and Malay in Sambas, to accept peace means to accept the return of the Madurese. The rejection of the Madurese also stems from personal interest that resulted over the issue of land ownership and occupation. It was common to hear stories of a Madurese IDP who returned to Sambas to negotiate the sale of his land but he was murdered and his body was not returned to his relatives.

Complementing the conflict management efforts of the local government are NGOs that are active in programs for economic rehabilitation and empowerment, capacity building with IDPs, and trauma recovery involving children. Several NGOs have also played important roles in bridging communication between ethnic groups but generally, it appears that many local NGOs still work along ethnic lines.

Drawing comparisons across conflicts

Looking across the Sambas, Ambon and Poso conflicts, theer are interesting areas of common ground. Tensions built up during the New Order era which centred mainly on competition over economic resources as a result of transmigration. In the case of Ambon and Poso, transmigration altered the religious balance. With the end of the New Order era, these tensions rose to the fore erupted into violence. In Ambon and Poso, the conflicts were later framed around religious issues. Churches and mosques were destroyed and burnt. To the contrary, the west Kalimantan conflict was framed around ethnic issues and “not a single mosque was destroyed during the conflict,” according to participants.

Interestingly, youths have been widely reported as the trigger to conflict in the three areas. The violence in Poso was allegedly triggered by a seemingly petty incident that took place on Christmas Eve in 1998, involving fighting between a Christian and Muslim youth in which the latter was subsequently stabbed. In the Sambas conflict, violence was triggered by a series of petty incidents involving youths from the Madura, Malay and Dayak community. This trend can be attributed to the low level of education and widespread unemployment. As there is no channel for these youths to direct their energy, they became vulnerable to provocation and street fights. Hence, we have often heard in these workshop discussions that it is important to ensure that the youth receive the necessary education and assistance on employment as they are often the troublemakers.

Across the three workshops, participants blamed those with political interests for inciting the conflict. However, in the case of Sambas the role of external provocateurs was less clear although participants questioned the real motive behind heavy mobilisation of troops from other parts of Indonesia.

It appears that throughout the three conflicts, the widespread atrocities and human rights abuses committed by the military instilled a sense of awareness among locals that they have been used to achieve a greater political purpose. Whether true or not, this belief helped unite local communities in a search for peace.

In all three conflicts, the government’s policy was dominated by a security approach. There was heavy troop presence in all three locations. Participants from the three workshops were generally very critical of the role of the security forces. There were repeated claims that the security forces were not the neutral party they were supposed to be in diffusing the violence. In Ambon and Poso, military and police took sides in the fighting between the Christians and Muslims and often, only served to worsen the situation.

There were numerous rumours that the security forces had supply weapons to the conflicting parties and were responsible for allowing Laskar Jihad into Ambon and Poso. In Sambas, the security forces also came under much criticism by the different ethnic groups for protecting the other and for having a hand in the killing of the Madurese. Later, the strong intervention of the central government, complemented by peacemaking efforts at the grassroots level, paved the way for the Malino I Declaration in Poso and the Manilo II Agreement in Ambon. Strong intervention by the central government and a vibrant civil society were both lacking in Sambas during the conflict. According to a local government representative, it was hard to intervene without the local government being accused of bias.

Another common claim throughout the three areas, in the aftermath of the conflict, was the government’s emphasis on development and rebuilding of infrastructures at the expense of reconciliation and reintegration of the conflicting parties. As mentioned in both the Ambon and Poso workshops, the local government is inclined to the development approach as success is easier to measure in material terms. However, sometimes resources are not put to optimal use due to lack of coordination between the district and provincial government as well as corruption.

On IDPs, local governments are more inclined to adopt relocation measures as opposed to reconciliation. In the case of Ambon, for instance, relocation had the undesired effect of strengthening segregation as relocation settlement for IDPs created Muslim or Christian enclaves whereas before the communities were more integrated. Similarly in west Kalimantan, Madurese IDP resettlement contributed to segregation, resulting in minimal communication between the Madurese and surrounding communities.

On reconciliation, Ambon and Poso have made more progress than Sambas where prejudice and stereotypes remain very strong. While traditional practices and values such as pela gandong and sintuwu maruso have played a key role in preserving harmonious relations in Maluku and Poso respectively, discussions on the role of adat seem to be lacking in the context of Sambas as the role of adat has significantly weakened. Participants, however, pointed out that traditional mechanism of conflict resolution and reconciliation has much to offer and these practices should be revitalised in west Kalimantan.

Recommendations

The discussion in Pontianak produced two principal recommendations. The first is to revitalise traditional values (kearifan lokal). Many cultural practices carry messages of peace but these practices have broken down due to modernisation. For instance, adat Pamabang was utilised in the aftermath of the 1997 conflict in Sanggau Ledo. Adat Pamabang is a ritual that originates from the Dayak community that is observed by conflicting parties when they agree on a ceasefire. This ritual was carried out for two weeks and is meant to cleanse the earth from evils. Participants also recommended the implementation of regional regulation or perda on the role of these traditions.

The second recommendation involved the creation of a communication forum to encourage and foster interaction between the different ethnic groups. The forum can be led by influential figures of different ethnicity. Participants agreed that manifestation of ethnic stereotypes occurred over time due to lack of interaction between the ethnic groups.

A participant from the local government suggested inviting the Madurese and Dayak to an annual event in Pontianak, the ‘Festival Budaya Bumi Khatulistiwa,’ publicise the event and carefully ensure that the two ethnic groups mingle and interact with one another. Such an orchestrated event could be the stepping stone to re-establishing communication between the two sides that have broken down and with the hope that it will gradually build trust.

Conclusion

In contrast to the Ambon and Poso workhops, recommendations were less forthcoming in the discussions of the Sambas conflict. But there was clear consensus that reconciliation remains a key problem to date. Ethnic stereotype and prejudice have been cited as the main obstacle to reconciliation between the Madurese and Dayak in Sambas. Peace is fragile as it rests on the notion that the Madurese will not return to Sambas.

Posted by Matthew Shannon Stumpf on March 11, 2010. Respond »

Research Tools: Literature Reviews on Internal Conflicts in India and Indonesia

The HD Centre and its partners have released two literature reviews in support of their project “Comparative Perspectives on Conflict Management in Asia.” Both are available on the web site of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies in Singapore.

A review of material on conflict management in India, conducted in partnership with the Delhi Policy Group, focuses on conflicts in Kashmir and Manipur, as well as on the Naxalites. Read it here.

A review of material on conflict management in Indonesia, conducted in partnership with the Peace-Building Institute (Institut Titian Perdamaian) and the Indonesian Institute of Sciences (LIPI), focuses on Papua, Poso, Maluku and Indonesia more broadly. Read it here.

Posted by Matthew Shannon Stumpf on March 4, 2010. Respond »

Indonesia and the West

Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono will engage with two of his administration’s closest allies in March. In mid-March he will make a long delayed visit to the country’s Southerly neighbour, Australia; later in the month US President Barrack Obama will make his long delayed formal visit to Indonesia, a return to the country of his boyhood he had promised to make in the first months of his administration.

These visits will be opportunities to define Indonesia’s relations with two of the Asia-Pacific’s important ‘Western’ components. In doing so, Yudhoyono will find himself having to walk a fine line between a full embrace of western values and strategic goals, and the emerging sense of identity and purpose Indonesia wants to articulate as an emerging medium-sized Asian power.  Indonesia’s foreign policy as articulated by Yudhoyono tries hard to blur the distinction, promoting democracy and human rights as universal – neither Asian nor Western—and arguing a form of strategic ambiguity that makes Indonesia an ally of nobody but friend of all. 

This ambiguity works because Indonesia is far too big to ignore or pigeon-hole.  It also helps cloak or reduce Indonesia’s profile as the biggest member of ASEAN, and builds confidence with its neighbours in security terms. But that doesn’t stop both Australia and the U.S. trying to elevate their ties with Jakarta to special status. The United States is courting Jakarta with a strategic partnership, whilst Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd’s proposed Asia Pacific Asian community originally envisaged Indonesia as a key member in Southeast Asia, rather than ASEAN as a whole.

When big powers come courting Indonesia its neighbours grow uneasy, but at the same time, no Asian superpower or significant strategic player wants to see Indonesia left out of any critical alliance. After all one only has to recall the 1960s and the unease created by Indonesia’s founding President Soekarno’s non aligned notions of “New Emerging Forces” that brought the country close to joining the Communist bloc – at least in the eyes of Western Cold War protagonists.  The resulting geopolitical tension stimulated regional conflict and internal political upheaval.

History has taught Indonesian policy makers to harness its strategic allure to more pressing non-traditional security issues on the domestic and global agenda. It is surely soothing to Indonesia’s regional neighbours that the main thrust of the emerging strategic partnership with the United States is helping to strengthen the education system at home and forge a common position on climate change overseas.

Meanwhile, Indonesia’s putative role as a key security partner for Australia has been thwarted by a cacophony of criticism of Canberra’s East Asian Community blueprint emanating from other ASEAN member states.  Besides, Jakarta and Canberra now have more pressing issues of common concern to deal with focused on waves of immigrants that pass through Indonesian waters in search of a new life in Australia.   

The question is whether this careful layering of Indonesia’s strategic ties goes too far in terms of appeasing its neighbours and falls short of meeting its foreign policy ambitions. 

Lately, there has been a debate in Indonesian policy circles about how constrained Indonesia should be by its ASEAN membership.  There are those who would like to see Indonesia free to take singular rather than regional positions on issues like democracy in Myanmar, for example. The Yudhoyono administration has also expressed a desire to play a bigger role in regional and international efforts to resolve conflict, but feels constrained to act in its own neighbourhood by ASEAN conventions of strict non-interference and decision making by consensus.

It is a pity that Indonesia feels so constrained, for one might wonder how a closer partnership both with Australia and the United States might affect the region in a number of ways. It might for example help promote human rights and democratic values more effectively, open the door sooner to regional free trade mechanisms, and reduce the need for the presence of foreign forces.

Alas, these notions are fanciful, as it is highly unlikely that Asia’s principal emerging powers India and China would make it easy for Indonesia to alter its conventional low strategic profile. In many ways, Indonesia is cursed by geography – sprawled across strategic passages and part of a region that sits between larger contesting powers.

Having said this, there are specific niches that Indonesia can and should fill with support from larger powers like the United States. As an emerging medium sized power, and the largest Muslim democracy in the world, Indonesia is well placed to bridge the divide that has opened up between the Muslim and non-Muslim world, and which has become a protracted strategic preoccupation for Western powers in specific places. This gives Indonesia an advantage in places like Pakistan, Afghanistan and even the Yemen, where, with the correctly calibrated approach and sufficient capacity, a lot of animosity towards the West could be defused. 

Similarly, in the area of climate change, Indonesia’s more proactive posture, acting as a middleman, less aligned to either the developed or developing world, could help the stalled UN process move forward.

It is therefore gratifying to see ideas emanating from Jakarta such as a possible role for Indonesia in helping to rebuild Afghanistan’s police force, or the proposal to host an informal ministerial meeting on climate change ahead of the UN meeting in Mexico. In this regard, it would be helpful if Indonesia’s regional neighbours spent less time carping about the country’s shortcomings and lent more support to its creative diplomatic urges.

Posted by Michael Vatikiotis on February 25, 2010. Respond »