Guest Post: Rohaiza Asi on Conflict Management in Indonesia

“Conflict Management Strategies in Indonesia: Comparing the experiences of Poso in Central Sulawesi, Maluku and West Kalimantan”

This guest post is by Rohaiza Asi, Project Officer, The Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, Singapore

In the third of a series of three workshops on internal conflict in Indonesia, the Centre of Humanitarian Dialogue has continued to explore common factors that generated brief but intense periods of ethnic and religious violence, examined the factors contributing to the outbreak of conflict and assessed conflict management efforts. The workshops were conducted jointly in the field with the Indonesian Institut Titian Perdamaian (ITP) and funded by the Government of Canada. Discussions were held in Pontianak, West Kalimantan on “Conflict Management Strategies in Indonesia, comparing the experiences of Poso in Central Sulawesi, Maluku and West Kalimantan.”

The discussion on west Kalimantan was held in February. Participants came from the Dayak community in Pontianak and Sambas, Madurese as well as Melayu settlers. Several government officials were also present.

Overview of the West Kalimantan Conflict

In the years before the fall of Soeharto, ethno-nationalist sentiments ran high and indigenous communities demanded for greater control over local territories. Fault lines between the indigenous Dayak, Malay and the Madurese settlers had already emerged by then. But the end of the New Order regime and the opening up of political space in Indonesia allowed for the expression of violent contestation.

In December 1996, at a concert in Sanggau Ledo, a group of Madurese youth injured two Dayaks in a fight over a previous dispute involving a girl. Rumours spread that the two Dayaks had been killed when in fact, they were not. This led to revenge motivated acts by the Dayaks as they burned hundreds of Madurese homes, markets and property over the next two weeks. The Madurese retaliated with more violence. In February 1997, the Dayaks engaged in a traditional ritual of passing the ‘red bowl’ (of chicken blood) from village to village to invite these villages to join in the war. This let to escalation of conflict and by April 1997, an estimated 500 Madurese perished.

In 1999, violence started again, this time in Sambas, between Malays and Madurese. Again, the violence was triggered by petty incidents between the youths of both communities. Dayaks soon joined in the conflict. During this period of fighting, an estimated of 200 casualties were reported although unofficial estimates were much higher. As the conflict raged, many Madurese fled to Pontianak as well as to Madura and East Java. By the year 2000, as many as 50,000 Madurese had been displaced. To date, most Madurese from Sambas have not returned and have chosen to resettle in or near Pontianak, the provincial capital.

The violent conflict that erupted in west Kalimantan centred mainly on competition over resources, transmigration and ethnic stereotypes particularly targeted against the Madurese. Policies implemented during the New Order regime had also contributed to some of the problems in the region. Laws implemented by the central government in the 1970s affected the status of land in Kalimantan and gave plenty of logging concessions to foreign companies. In addition, the Dayaks perceived government policies pertaining to land, forest and other economic activities as favouring the Madurese.

Conflict Management in Sambas

Government approaches to conflict management adopted a security approach, relocation of IDPs and development as well as reconciliation between the conflicting parties.

The government’s approach to the management of IDPs has mainly been characterised by relocation. This includes building new resettlement homes and facilities for the IDP community and disbursing 5 million rupiah to others to rebuild their houses. However, in many cases, living condition is reported to be dismal and in some instances, the relocation of these IDPs has caused unhappiness and tension with surrounding host communities.

Participants in the discussion commonly criticized the government’s approach to reconciliation, blaming the lack of political will. Participants claimed that reconciliation has been more successful in central Kalimantan due to the efforts of the local government. In central Kalimantan, local regulations or perda has been implemented specifically pertaining to the management of IDPs. Perda No. 9/2001 states that the return of IDPs is based on the equal rights of citizen to live together in peace, and there should be respect of local customs or adat. The regulation further states that IDPs must re-register with local authorities in order to be considered for repatriation and they must be able to produce a previous ID card and proof of home ownership.

Overall, reconciliation remains the main challenge in the district of Sambas. The majority of the Dayak community remain resistant to the return of the Madurese to Sambas. It is felt that persistent segregation between the different ethnic groups in west Kalimantan that existed even prior to the outbreak of the conflict in 1999 has strengthened the prevalent stereotypes within the community. As communication and interaction between the Dayak and the Madurese has been minimal, this has reinforced prejudice. Additionally, reconciliation efforts undertaken by the local government, community leaders and NGOs have been ineffective as most tended to be symbolic and not designed to address the issue of distrust between the two communities.

Participants also attributed the failure of reconciliation to the absence of an influential and charismatic leader on both sides to lead the reconciliation process. Moreover in the west Kalimantan context, adat or tradition no longer occupies an important position and hence the historical role of the adat leader as the enforcer of social harmony is no longer applicable.

Another common claim throughout the workshop was that local government does not possess a clear understanding and conceptualisation of peacemaking and peacebuilding. Throughout the conflict, the government tended to rely heavily on security measures and took on a purely developmental approach thereafter. Moreover, the concept of peace remains problematic in the local context. For the Dayak and Malay in Sambas, to accept peace means to accept the return of the Madurese. The rejection of the Madurese also stems from personal interest that resulted over the issue of land ownership and occupation. It was common to hear stories of a Madurese IDP who returned to Sambas to negotiate the sale of his land but he was murdered and his body was not returned to his relatives.

Complementing the conflict management efforts of the local government are NGOs that are active in programs for economic rehabilitation and empowerment, capacity building with IDPs, and trauma recovery involving children. Several NGOs have also played important roles in bridging communication between ethnic groups but generally, it appears that many local NGOs still work along ethnic lines.

Drawing comparisons across conflicts

Looking across the Sambas, Ambon and Poso conflicts, theer are interesting areas of common ground. Tensions built up during the New Order era which centred mainly on competition over economic resources as a result of transmigration. In the case of Ambon and Poso, transmigration altered the religious balance. With the end of the New Order era, these tensions rose to the fore erupted into violence. In Ambon and Poso, the conflicts were later framed around religious issues. Churches and mosques were destroyed and burnt. To the contrary, the west Kalimantan conflict was framed around ethnic issues and “not a single mosque was destroyed during the conflict,” according to participants.

Interestingly, youths have been widely reported as the trigger to conflict in the three areas. The violence in Poso was allegedly triggered by a seemingly petty incident that took place on Christmas Eve in 1998, involving fighting between a Christian and Muslim youth in which the latter was subsequently stabbed. In the Sambas conflict, violence was triggered by a series of petty incidents involving youths from the Madura, Malay and Dayak community. This trend can be attributed to the low level of education and widespread unemployment. As there is no channel for these youths to direct their energy, they became vulnerable to provocation and street fights. Hence, we have often heard in these workshop discussions that it is important to ensure that the youth receive the necessary education and assistance on employment as they are often the troublemakers.

Across the three workshops, participants blamed those with political interests for inciting the conflict. However, in the case of Sambas the role of external provocateurs was less clear although participants questioned the real motive behind heavy mobilisation of troops from other parts of Indonesia.

It appears that throughout the three conflicts, the widespread atrocities and human rights abuses committed by the military instilled a sense of awareness among locals that they have been used to achieve a greater political purpose. Whether true or not, this belief helped unite local communities in a search for peace.

In all three conflicts, the government’s policy was dominated by a security approach. There was heavy troop presence in all three locations. Participants from the three workshops were generally very critical of the role of the security forces. There were repeated claims that the security forces were not the neutral party they were supposed to be in diffusing the violence. In Ambon and Poso, military and police took sides in the fighting between the Christians and Muslims and often, only served to worsen the situation.

There were numerous rumours that the security forces had supply weapons to the conflicting parties and were responsible for allowing Laskar Jihad into Ambon and Poso. In Sambas, the security forces also came under much criticism by the different ethnic groups for protecting the other and for having a hand in the killing of the Madurese. Later, the strong intervention of the central government, complemented by peacemaking efforts at the grassroots level, paved the way for the Malino I Declaration in Poso and the Manilo II Agreement in Ambon. Strong intervention by the central government and a vibrant civil society were both lacking in Sambas during the conflict. According to a local government representative, it was hard to intervene without the local government being accused of bias.

Another common claim throughout the three areas, in the aftermath of the conflict, was the government’s emphasis on development and rebuilding of infrastructures at the expense of reconciliation and reintegration of the conflicting parties. As mentioned in both the Ambon and Poso workshops, the local government is inclined to the development approach as success is easier to measure in material terms. However, sometimes resources are not put to optimal use due to lack of coordination between the district and provincial government as well as corruption.

On IDPs, local governments are more inclined to adopt relocation measures as opposed to reconciliation. In the case of Ambon, for instance, relocation had the undesired effect of strengthening segregation as relocation settlement for IDPs created Muslim or Christian enclaves whereas before the communities were more integrated. Similarly in west Kalimantan, Madurese IDP resettlement contributed to segregation, resulting in minimal communication between the Madurese and surrounding communities.

On reconciliation, Ambon and Poso have made more progress than Sambas where prejudice and stereotypes remain very strong. While traditional practices and values such as pela gandong and sintuwu maruso have played a key role in preserving harmonious relations in Maluku and Poso respectively, discussions on the role of adat seem to be lacking in the context of Sambas as the role of adat has significantly weakened. Participants, however, pointed out that traditional mechanism of conflict resolution and reconciliation has much to offer and these practices should be revitalised in west Kalimantan.

Recommendations

The discussion in Pontianak produced two principal recommendations. The first is to revitalise traditional values (kearifan lokal). Many cultural practices carry messages of peace but these practices have broken down due to modernisation. For instance, adat Pamabang was utilised in the aftermath of the 1997 conflict in Sanggau Ledo. Adat Pamabang is a ritual that originates from the Dayak community that is observed by conflicting parties when they agree on a ceasefire. This ritual was carried out for two weeks and is meant to cleanse the earth from evils. Participants also recommended the implementation of regional regulation or perda on the role of these traditions.

The second recommendation involved the creation of a communication forum to encourage and foster interaction between the different ethnic groups. The forum can be led by influential figures of different ethnicity. Participants agreed that manifestation of ethnic stereotypes occurred over time due to lack of interaction between the ethnic groups.

A participant from the local government suggested inviting the Madurese and Dayak to an annual event in Pontianak, the ‘Festival Budaya Bumi Khatulistiwa,’ publicise the event and carefully ensure that the two ethnic groups mingle and interact with one another. Such an orchestrated event could be the stepping stone to re-establishing communication between the two sides that have broken down and with the hope that it will gradually build trust.

Conclusion

In contrast to the Ambon and Poso workhops, recommendations were less forthcoming in the discussions of the Sambas conflict. But there was clear consensus that reconciliation remains a key problem to date. Ethnic stereotype and prejudice have been cited as the main obstacle to reconciliation between the Madurese and Dayak in Sambas. Peace is fragile as it rests on the notion that the Madurese will not return to Sambas.

Posted by Matthew Shannon Stumpf on March 11, 2010. Respond »

Research Tools: Literature Reviews on Internal Conflicts in India and Indonesia

The HD Centre and its partners have released two literature reviews in support of their project “Comparative Perspectives on Conflict Management in Asia.” Both are available on the web site of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies in Singapore.

A review of material on conflict management in India, conducted in partnership with the Delhi Policy Group, focuses on conflicts in Kashmir and Manipur, as well as on the Naxalites. Read it here.

A review of material on conflict management in Indonesia, conducted in partnership with the Peace-Building Institute (Institut Titian Perdamaian) and the Indonesian Institute of Sciences (LIPI), focuses on Papua, Poso, Maluku and Indonesia more broadly. Read it here.

Posted by Matthew Shannon Stumpf on March 4, 2010. Respond »

New Asia Security Initiative Policy Research

ASI participants have published two new policy research papers this week, on the effect of trade on East Asian alliances and on the impact of upcoming elections in Burma on ceasefire groups.

A new East Asia Institute Working Paper, “Ties That Bind? Assessing the Impact of Economic Interdependence on East Asian Alliances,” by Dong Sun Lee and Sung Eun Kim of Korea University, questions whether “increasing economic interdependence markedly strengthens East Asian security alliances.”

A new Centre for Security Analysis Security Watch, “Going to the Polls: Opportunity or Setback for Myanmar’s Ceasefire Groups?,” finds that groups that have agreed to ceasefires with the Burmese junta are “divided in the run up to Myanmar’s first elections in twenty years ...”

Posted by Matthew Shannon Stumpf on March 2, 2010. Respond »

Guest Post: Rohaiza Asi on Conflict in Poso

Conflict Management Strategies in Indonesia: Learning from the Poso Experience

By Rohaiza Asi, Project Officer, HD Centre, Singapore

On the December 8, the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (HD Centre) together with the Indonesian conflict management NGO Institut Titian Perdamaian (ITP), held a one day workshop in Poso, Central Sulawesi on “Conflict Management Strategies in Indonesia: Learning from the Poso Experience”. The workshop brought together representatives from local government agencies, NGOs, academics, religious and traditional leaders to discuss conflict management strategies in Poso and the progress towards reconciliation and reconstruction that has been achieved to date since the outbreak of violent conflict in 1998.

The presence of local government officials and non-government actors at the Poso workshop enabled the exchange of information on conflict management strategies over the past decade; exposed approaches and policies to constructive criticism; highlighted key problems in current conflict management strategies; and generated useful recommendations for both government agencies and NGOs. 

Conflict Management in Poso

The violence in Poso was allegedly triggered by a seemingly petty incident that took place on Christmas Eve in 1998, involving fighting between a Christian and Muslim youth in which the latter was subsequently stabbed. Rumours quickly spread and soon assumed religious overtones dividing Muslim and Christian communities. Subsequent incidents triggered more riots and violence erupted between the two communities. In the single bloodiest incident on 28 May 2000, Christian militias massacred as many as 200 Muslim men hiding at the Walisongo Islamic school and destroyed the adjoining village of Sintuwu Lemba.

However, the underlying causes of the conflict were more complex and could be attributed to a combination of horizontal and socio-economic inequalities. There were historical inequalities between the Christian and Muslim communities which were then compounded by state-backed Islamisation in the 1990s further fuelling enmities between the two religious communities. Transmigration of Muslims from other parts of Indonesia altered the religious balance in the region, which heightened tensions and increased Christian anxieties of political and economic marginalisation particularly in the face of scarce resources. Throughout the New Order regime, outbreaks of violence occurred intermittently between Muslims and Christians in the region, but the Soeharto government responded with swift repression. Following the collapse of the New Order regime in 1998, new political circumstances led to intense political competition that exploited religion and identity cleavages. In a nutshell, the Poso conflict erupted into violence once religion and ethnicity were exploited, in the words of one workshop participant, as “political vehicles for certain elite interests.”

After almost three years of violence in which an estimated 700 people were killed, the Indonesian government initiated the Malino peace process in December 2001. Representatives of both religious communities, ten people from each side, were chosen to reflect their respective constituencies. The signed agreement consisted of ten key points that were supposed to address most of the immediate causes of the conflict ranging from rehabilitating infrastructure, returning IDPs, and land ownership rights.

The Malino agreement did not settle the conflict entirely. Some attributed the weakness of the Malino Agreement to several factors which include the elitist nature of the agreement and the lack of consultation with locals, as well as the use of quantitative achievements as measures of success.  After the signing of the peace agreement, Poso continued to be marred by intermittent violence with the latest and more noticeable outburst occurring in late 2006 after the execution of three Christian men over their alleged roles in the violence in the Poso conflict between 1998 and 2001.

It has also been reported that the conflict was fuelled by the presence of Jemaah Islamiyah, Laskar Jihad and other militant groups that came from outside Poso. Several participants pointed out that the infiltration of such militant groups stemmed from involvement of those at the elite level and the mishandling of the situation by security forces. Some reports suggest that these militant groups were able to garner the support of local Muslims disenchanted with the authorities. But beyond some sporadic local support, Islamic extremist ideology did not gain a foothold among local communities. Participants said they were more concerned with matters that affect their daily lives such as economic reconstruction, reconciliation and good governance.

As in the case of Maluku, particular stress was laid on the effectiveness of grassroots and civil society conflict management efforts. Prior to the signing of the Malino Agreement, numerous initiatives existed at the grassroots level to address conflict and to stop the violence. In several villages, consensus was forged between the religious communities to end fighting. Trading and business dealings continued in some areas and became the starting point for reconciliation. Several communities also cooperated informally to assist those people who were displaced by the conflict.

Women were cited as playing an important role in the reconciliation of the conflicting parties. While the men engaged in violence, women focused on the survival of their families and protection of children. They communicated with their counterparts across the religious divide and continued trading with each other in the market place. However, the role of women and their contribution to conflict resolution has not been fully exposed.

Several peacebuilding measures and programs were undertaken following the immediate signing of the Malino agreement. These initiatives included the formation of working groups to follow up on the implementation of the agreement as well as address security, economic and social issues; the promotion of reconciliation by forming an Inter-religious Communication Forum (FKUB) and activating the lembaga adat or customary body. In addition, measures were taken to assist the return of the IDPs and problems resulting from their displacement as well as reconstruction. However, participants generally were critical of government programs saying they were too heavily focused on physical reconstruction and financial assistance, in contrast to the focus of NGOs and civil society groups on communal reconciliation in the post-Malino phase.

Key Problems

A key problem for the participants was the lack of follow up on the implementation of the Malino Agreement. As one participant put it, the number of people in the working group tasked with implementing the agreement has been decreasing over the years with a minimal budget to work from. Some of the outstanding problems include: the slow pace of reconstruction of mosques and churches; insufficient deployment of organic security personnel; and, the poor management of IDPs. One workshop participant complained that during the conflict data had been submitted on IDPs to local government officials. “But they said they could not help the IDPs as the central government has not allocated any budget for that purpose.”

Related to the last point, the government argues that the lack of proper documentation makes it hard to keep track of the movement of IDPs. As a result, some IDPs received assistance more than once; land owned by IDPs has been sold prior to the conflict for which there exist no documentation; and, often names of deceased people appear on the list of IDPs. 

Underlying these deficiencies in government-backed conflict management strategies are budgetary issues. Participants highlighted the local government’s limited operational budget, as well as insufficient levels of central government assistance that does not meet the needs of the local community. Additionally, there has been no evaluation, review and/ or follow up of the peace building programs and assistance in Poso. Hence, there is lack of information on the real needs of the local communities as well as the types of assistance that work and those that do not.

While it is common for non-governmental actors to accuse government of not doing enough, it appears that the lack of coordination between government and civil society is also a contributing factor. Participants noted the tendency for various elements in society and government to undertake peace efforts in the region without consulting the other.

Another overarching problem identified by workshop participants is the weak legal framework for conflict management. Conflict management policies that exist currently lack the legal weight to deal with the problems in Poso specifically and Indonesia, generally. It was felt that a more rigorous law on conflict management is needed.

Recommendations

Given the key problems highlighted with regard to the conflict resolution process in Poso, the following recommendations were put forward by participants:

• To undertake an evaluation of the Malino Agreement and to have an independent body assess the extent and effect of its implementation.

• To create a data system, particularly pertaining to IDPs, that is accurate, integrative and accessible. Related to this, to form an independent team to look into and resolve the problems of data and documentation at the local level.

• Peacebuilding policies have to be based on reconciliation and not just physical assistance and reconstruction.

• To conduct a review on the posting of security personnel at the village level by consulting all stakeholders.

• To conduct regular consultations called, ‘Musyawarah Sintuwu Maruso’ (a phrase in local dialect that means ‘Strong when united’) with all stakeholders in Poso to discuss and update on the progress of peace building in Poso.

Conclusion

Based on discussions during the workshop, it appears that the main problem in Poso centres on the lack of coordination between stakeholders and lack of follow up on peace building programs. “If the Malino Agreement has been properly implemented and evaluated from the beginning,’ said one participant, “most of the problems in Poso that resulted from the conflict would have been resolved.” The same complaint about poor implementation and follow up of a government brokered peace agreement was heard in Maluku.  At the very least the workshop indicated the need for a thorough independent appraisal of conflict management efforts to date in order to identify critical issues that could spark a resurgence of violence down the road.  It would seem that despite the resolution of many of Indonesia’s internal conflicts in the past decade, there is no room for complacency.

About the workshop series and project

The workshop, the second in a series of three on regional conflict in Indonesia and supported by the Government of Canada, is part of the HD Centre’s “Comparative Perspectives on Conflict Management in Asia”, a multi-year research project supported by the Asia Security Initiative of the MacArthur Foundation. The goal is to generate fresh analysis on conflict management and prevention in India, Indonesia and the Philippines. The first workshop held in Ambon in October 2009 provided useful information on conflict management initiatives undertaken by the government and non-government actors in the area. The third and last workshop will be held in West Kalimantan in early February 2010.

Posted by Matthew Shannon Stumpf on January 11, 2010. Respond »

Pakistan: Sectarian Terror and Killing Ritual on Muharram

Annual Shia festivity of Youm- e- Ashura (also known as Muharram in the region) has been marred by suicide blasts and sectarian violence in Pakistan. The epicenters of the latest terror violence were centered around port city of Karachi and Muzaffarabad in the capital city of Pakistan Administered Kashmir targeting Shia community. The December 28 suicide attack took place near the Light House at Jinnah Road. Besides deaths and destructions caused by the blast itself, the resulting mob violence that spread around Karachi city estimated to have destroyed nearly 500 shops and many vehicles.

Mourning processions by minority Shiite Muslims in Pakistan are often attacked by majority Sunni militants. Karachi blast was fourth in a series of attacks targeting Shia processions and gatherings in the last three days.

•December 28: A suicide bomber blew himself up near a Shiite mourning march in Karachi killing at least 33 people (according to latest fatality count) and injuring several others.

•December 27: At least 15 people were killed and over 100 others injured in suicide blasts near the Pir Alam Shah Bukhari Tomb, a place for Shia prayers in Muzaffarabad, provincial capital of Pakistan Administered Kashmir (PAK). Another suicide attack however, was foiled elsewhere in the Bagh district in PAK that day.

•December 26: A remote controlled bomb blast injured nearly 26 Shia mourners at Khalifat Chowk in North Nazimabad Town of Karachi.

•December 26: Another bomb blast in Orangi Town in Karachi left 24 people injured. Angry mob had resorted to arsons and anti-government protests in reaction to the blast.

In Pakistan, pro Sunni terrorist groups used to carry out deadly attacks in regular intervals against minority Shia populations. Although no terrorist outfit has claimed responsibility so far, the needle of suspicion now is on the Sunni centric Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan and its affiliate anti-Shia outfit Lashkar- e- Jhangvi. According to a recent circular distributed by the Criminal Investigation Department (CID) of Pakistan the Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)’s newly floated suicide wing Mujahid Abu Faraz has reportedly been assigned to carry out country wide terrorist attacks during Ashura ceremony. The TTP leader Qari Hussain Mehmood has formed the group to avenge the death of Abu Faraz (a.k.a. Nasim Shah), a Taliban commander in Swat). Faraz, a close associate of Mullah Fazlullah, was killed during a recent fight (On 03 December) in the Kabal area of Swat.

Posted by Animesh Roul on December 28, 2009. Respond »