Blog
-
Cross Border Clashes in ASEAN
The emotional outburst of rage and threats of all out war that have accompanied another spat between Malaysia and Indonesia, this time over the use of an Indonesian dance in a Malaysian tourist promotion and ensuing arguments over food and batik cloth, says much about the deep sense of prejudice felt on either side of the Malacca Strait by two peoples with ethnic and religious ties in common. But cultural prejudice aside, it also speaks volumes about the underlying fragility of inter state relations in a region that is proud of its record of peace and security.
No member state of ASEAN has waged war with another since the mid-1960s, even if Thai troops served in the Vietnam war on the US-side. Perhaps Indonesia’s attempted invasion of Malaysia in the mid-1960s helps explain the extremely prickly relationship between these two ASEAN core member states, but it is more important to understand the combination of historical and modern factors that sustains a certain fragility about inter state relations that has helped prolong internal conflict on the margins and arguably prevent effective regional integration.
The modern borders of Southeast Asia, unlike some decolonized regions such as Africa, actually coincide with pre-colonial states, and therefore reflect historical enmities. The colonial powers came along and drew crude lines through the fuzzy zones of fealty and obligation that divided princely states. Thailand and Burma have a long modern history of border conflict, which isn’t surprising since the modern day boundary straddles the long chain of buffer territories that kept the two competing kingdoms apart. The present day boundary between Thailand and Malaysia straddles territory that the old Kingdom of Siam acquired through invasion in the late 18th and 19th century.
In the modern period, Malaysia has acquired territory in Borneo that is claimed by ethnic minority groups in neighbouring Philippines and Indonesia, and boundary disputes litter archipelagic Southeast Asia. Indonesia in fact is still in the process of agreeing upon its maritime boundaries with India, Papua New Guinea, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam.
This situation, with the constant threat of sudden inter state conflict, speaks volumes about the absence of formal mechanisms for resolving disputes in the region. When Thailand and Cambodia came to blows over a disputed Buddhist temple that straddles their border last year, regional diplomats were at a loss how to convene the parties and work towards a lasting settlement of the issue. The ten ASEAN states are reluctant to support regional based arbitration because of an allergy to interference, though they have frequently used the international court system, as was seen in the recent case of a disputed small island between Singapore and Malaysia. Indonesia and Malaysia also turned to the International Court of Justice to resolve a territorial dispute off Sabah. The court ruled in favour of Malaysia in 2002.
Looming over the region as a whole is China’s claim of a myriad of small islands in the South China Sea, which perhaps helps explain why attempts to create a pan-Asian regional mechanism for resolving border disputes fall on stony ground. It is widely suspected that China would prefer to sustain the ambiguity of its claims in the South China Sea as leverage in the pursuit of resources in the region.
What is needed is a more focused effort to create a regional mechanism for dispute settlement, one that isn’t hindered by sensitivities about sovereignty and geopolitical considerations imposed by great powers. Allowing disputes to erupt and be sustained without the intervention of mediating third parties allows emotions to run dangerously high in a region where ethnic and religious affiliation is fused with nationalism. To think that in the case of Indonesia and Malaysia it took some weeks before the two foreign ministers met to defuse tensions, and in the meantime there were local groups in Indonesia signing up volunteers to go to war and crush Malaysia.
-
Indonesia and Malaysia almost come to blows over disputed territorial waters
Rising tensions between Indonesia and Malaysia over the disputed Ambalat maritime area off East Kalimantan have brought the two neighbours close to open conflict in the past two weeks, highlighting once again the paucity of formal mechanism of dispute resolution in the ASEAN region.
Malaysia claims part of the oil-rich Ambalat region based on a 1979 maritime chart, while Indonesia bases its claim on the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, which states that the area belongs to Indonesia.
Leaders in both country have thankfully stressed they wish to see dialogue leading to a formal resolution of the overlapping claims. But as with all bilateral issues that pose a threat to peace in the ASEAN region, the problem is not the willingness to talk, but the lack of access to proper mediation of disputes.
It seems that no sooner than the threat of conflict appears in this region, two things generally happen: First, tensions immediately rise as nationalist drums are beaten on both sides, there usually follows a flurry of contacts and the hurried exchange of visits by high officials as attempts are made to defuse confrontation that could lead to armed conflict.
Second, in subsequent bilateral negations much is achieved in terms of finding ways to avoid an armed clash, but rarely is a formal a settlement of the dispute achieved. One of the few things the two sides tend to agree upon is the need to keep out meddling third parties to avoid internationalizing the issue.
Yet it is precisely this reluctance to engage impartial third party help that these boundary disputes, such Ambalat and also the Thai-Cambodian border dispute over Preah Viharn, which did result in armed conflict earlier this year, tend to fester unresolved.
In the case of Ambalat we can expect to see a flurry of bilateral contacts as the two sides seek to find a better way to avoid clashes in the region whilst each maintains the legitimacy of their claim. In other words, as is so often the case, they will seek to manage, rather than resolve the conflict so neither side loses face and risks a domestic political backlash.
It’s not that the region isn’t equipped with mechanisms for mediating disputes. Member states can always refer disputes among themselves to the ASEAN High Council, a forum for mediation that has never once been convened in the regional association’s more than 40 year history. This sort of spat is precisely what the ASEAN Secretary General should be empowered to use his good offices to help resolve. Doing so would give substantive meaning to ASEAN’s agreed development of a security community.
About This Blog
The Asia Security Initiative blog hosts a discussion of current events and security challenges in the Asia-Pacific, drawing from the policy research of the Asia Security Initiative network. Anchored by six expert bloggers, the blog also includes contributions from leading Asia Security Initiative-supported experts.
The opinions expressed on this site are those of the authors, and not necessarily those of the MacArthur Foundation. Bloggers have agreed to terms of use (PDF). The Foundation’s privacy policy applies to the entire Asia Security Initiative site.
Blog Archives
Read past blog entries and browse all entries by date, category & author in the Blog Archive »
Recent Posts
- Guest Post: Amy Searight on the Politics of Climate Change in Asia by Matthew Shannon Stumpf
- Soft power and foreign policy: A link and some thoughts by Swarna Rajagopalan
- In the News: What Indonesia Can Teach Burma by Matthew Shannon Stumpf
- The Importance of Open Diplomacy in Japan by Tobias Harris
- Guest Post: Rohaiza Asi on Conflict Management in Indonesia by Matthew Shannon Stumpf
- Jummas of CHTs: Caught Between Accord and Discord by Animesh Roul

