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The Importance of Open Diplomacy in Japan
Within a week of the formation of the first Bolshevik government, Leon Trotsky, the People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs, went to the foreign ministry and forced the staff to open safes containing secret treaties that the Tsarist government had made with the Allied powers over the course of World War I, treaties that for the most part concerned how the Allies would divide up the territorial spoils of war.
“Abolition of secret diplomacy,” wrote Trotsky, “is the first essential of an honorable, popular, and really democratic foreign policy.”
Lest anyone think this opposition to secret diplomacy was simply a reflection of the new government’s opposition to the “propertied minority,” the first of Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points was a call for “open covenants of peace, openly arrived at, after which there shall be no private international understandings of any kind but diplomacy shall proceed always frankly and in the public view.” (Although, it should be noted, the Fourteen Points were to a certain extent a response to the Bolsheviks.)
In Japan on Tuesday an expert panel established by the Hatoyama government to review secret agreements made between the US and Japanese governments from the 1960s onward released its report, confirming the existence of the ongoing agreement that permitted the introduction of US nuclear weapons into Japan for the duration of the cold war despite the three non-nuclear principles that would seem to prohibit precisely that. The panel revealed more than 300 documents, although it seems that some were missing. Naturally the panel drew criticism from recent LDP prime ministers, who had continued to deny the existence of the documents despite their existence having been confirmed by declassified US documents. On the other end of the political spectrum, Fukushima Mizuho, consumer affairs minister and head of the Social Democratic Party, praised the report as “ground-breaking.”
My point in linking the Bolshevik government’s release of secret treaties to the Democratic Party of Japan’s release of secret treaties is not to suggest that the DPJ is somehow dangerously radical or akin to the Bolsheviks. After all, by releasing the documents the Bolsheviks damaged the ongoing war effort and triggered Wilson’s efforts to recast the war as something other than a war among empires for territory. To a certain extent, the Hatoyama government is merely rectifying the Japanese side of the historical record, seeing as how the US stopped deploying nuclear weapons overseas at the end of the cold war and confirmed nearly a decade ago that the secret agreement had existed.
My point rather is that concerns about secret diplomacy are not unprecedented, and that they are naturally linked to broader concerns about how a country is governed. In this sense the Hatoyama government is doing more than historical recordkeeping, but rather it is showing that open government does not stop at water’s end. Not content with revealing the many ways in which bureaucrats — under the watch of LDP governments — have wasted taxpayer money, the DPJ wants to show how the LDP conducted foreign relations out of the sight of Japanese voters. It is perhaps easy for the DPJ government to criticize decisions made during the cold war, but then the Hatoyama government would not be the first to question cynical decisions made by governments during the cold war.
The DPJ has in fact been consistent in its opposition to secret diplomacy conducted by LDP-led governments, right up to the present day. When the DPJ opposed the extension of the Indian Ocean refueling mission after taking control of the upper house in 2007, central to its argument was that the government had not been forthright with information about what exactly the ships were doing there. Who was the fuel going to, and what were those ships doing after being refueled?
More importantly, the same concerns drive the Hatoyama government’s approach to the Futenma issue. Lost in the endless amounts of copy written about the dispute is that the Hatoyama government has been animated as much by the process by which the 2006 agreement was reached as by its content. The manifesto upon which the DPJ was elected, after all, promised only a review of the realignment roadmap. It made no promises about what the DPJ would push for instead. As the government has repeatedly stated, it is proceeding from a “zero base” as it conducts its review of the roadmap and possible alternatives. While the negotiation process and the roadmap that resulted were far from secret, the DPJ wanted to review whether LDP governments actually considered all options, skepticism that is not unwarranted given the long history of secret diplomacy with the US.
The Hatoyama government deserves some blame for not being clearer about why it wanted a review in the first place, which enabled some to paint the government as anti-American. But those who see the Futenma dispute in the worst possible light have misinterpreted the Hatoyama government’s position. I think that the Hatoyama government is approaching Futenma less as a foreign policy issue than as a domestic policy issue, because a bilateral agreement as complicated the realignment plan involves too many actors within Japan to be simply a bilateral matter for governments in Tokyo and Washington. Indeed, if the 2006 agreement has a flaw it is that the Koizumi government acted without the full approval of Okinawan constituents, which explains at least in part why subsequent LDP governments did little but drag their feet on implementing the agreement.
The Hatoyama government is acting in good faith in trying to find an agreement that will satisfy all parties, not just the US government. Not surprisingly it has found that “double-edged” diplomacy is tricky, if not impossible — little wonder that governments opt to keep their foreign affairs secret. As the May deadline for its review approaches, hints that the government is leaning towards a plan to build a Futenma replacement facility in Okinawa on land instead of offshore has prompted opposition from local governments and the prefectural assembly, from DPJ secretary-general Ozawa Ichiro, and from the US itself. The whole process could end in failure, with no one happy with the final outcome, least of all the Hatoyama government.
But whether or not the Hatoyama government succeeds, it is important to recognize that it is acting on the basis of an old idea, that a democratic foreign policy must necessarily be conducted in the sight of the people in whose name it is being conducted. In its pursuit of this aim, the Hatoyama government has also implicitly suggested that an alliance conducted behind closed doors is inappropriate for a more democratic Japan, that the alliance will not endure if it continues to rest upon secret agreements and understandings. -
Guest Post: Chu Shulong on North Korea Policy
The following is a guest post by Chu Shulong. This post is an except from an article originally published in “China and World Observation.”
The North Korea Nuclear Issue Calls for New Thinking and New Policy
On May 25, 2009, North Korea conducted another nuclear test in defiance of international opposition. North Korea’s behavior is a heavy blow to the denuclearization process of the Korean peninsula, sharpens tensions and undermines stability in North-East Asia, blocks the peaceful solution to the North Korea nuclear issue, and challenges China and other countries’ North Korea policy. The international community, including China, South Korea, etc., must reflect and adjust their policies towards North Korea.
First of all, North Korea’s behavior, way of thinking, and logic are completely wrong. North Korea argues irrationally that its nuclear test doesn’t violate any treaty or agreement that it has signed or been a part, so it has right to conduct nuclear test and develop nuclear deterrence. This statement is wrong.
To reach the goal of Korean peninsula denuclearization, North Korea has once signed a series of agreements and treaties, the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Framework Agreement between the United States of America and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea in 1994, etc. However, after the treaties come into effect, on the one hand, North Korea takes advantages of these treaties, getting a large amount of international aid; on the other hand, it reneges on its promises again and again. During the Six-Party Talks since 2003, as one party to the talks, North Korea solemnly committed to the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula three times in the form of statements and declarations. However, North Korea still develops nuclear weapons, and conducts nuclear test none the less. The May 25 nuclear test, obviously, is a flagrant violation of the 9/19 Joint Statement, as well as the 2/13 and 10/3 Joint Documents of the Six-Party Talks. The North Korean Central News Agency said the test had been “safely conducted on a new higher level in terms of its explosive power and technology of its control. The test will contribute to defending the sovereignty of the country and the nation and socialism and ensuring peace and security on the Korean peninsula and the region;” “it is a crucial step of strengthening the North Korea nuclear deterrence in self-defense.” Does it mean “North Korea doesn’t violate any international treaty it has signed” just as North Korea declared? Of course not! Obviously, North Korea views nuclear weapons as one part of its military strength, and attempts to create nuclear deterrent capability. This kind of behavior openly breaks its commitment to abandon its nuclear weapons and realize the denuclearization of the Korea peninsula.
Facts never lie. North Korea not only breaks its commitments, violates international agreements; further more, its behavior, way of thinking, logic and words are back and forth, outlawed and unbridled, dishonest and unprincipled, regardless of the will and firm position of the international community. This extreme behavior, ignoring international law, regulations, agreement and public opinion, is a very rare phenomenon in international relations in recent decades or even in the last one hundred years. It will be despised by the entire world.
North Korea’s behavior, indeed, goes to extremes. However, it is not accidental; it is the continuation of North Korea’s policy that always lacks of credit and always is extreme. It seems that North Korea is proud of its so called “successful strategy”: so far, North Korea has developed and possessed nuclear weapons; because of the possession of nuclear weapons, it could receive increasing attention throughout the world, improve its diplomatic status, expand its diplomatic space, enhance relations with the United States and other countries, get international aid which is aimed to persuade North Korea to abandon developing nuclear weapons. That is North Korea’s strategy: “Do what the international community opposes continuously.” The logic behind the strategy can be explained like this: If you oppose me in something, I will say that I may listen to you and might not do it again, but only if you must treat me well, improve relations between us, give me a large amount of diplomatic and economic “compensation.” Notwithstanding, after I’ve got all the things I need, I will act out the same process again: do what you oppose, then ask for benefits if you want me to abandon my behavior, and so on ... In recent decades, North Korea has always acted like this, fooling the international community and fooling the “friendly countries” which try to help it.
The international community, including China, should take responsibility for North Korea’s shameless, dishonest and unprincipled behavior. In order to improve “North-South relations,” in order to maintain “the traditional friendly and cooperative relations,” or other considerations, South Korea, China and Russia give way to North Korea’s creditless and rogue behavior. Because of these countries’ unprincipled accommodation toward North Korea, they nurse a viper in their own bosom; North Korea becomes more and more unscrupulous and fearless. They push the Korean peninsula issue to the edge of danger.
For the sake of economic development, China needs to create and maintain a peaceful and stable environment. In terms of North Korea nuclear issue, China’s benefit lays in the peace, stability and prosperity of Korean peninsula. As one of the North’s most important sources of assistance, China gives North Korea food, energy and other aid selflessly. In order to maintain the peace on the Korean peninsula, and help North Korea join the international community, as the host of the Six-Party Talks, China carries out a great deal of diplomatic efforts to realize the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula. However, in defiance of international opinion, North Korea conducts nuclear tests over and over again, increases tensions and undermines the stability of the Korean peninsula with intent. North Korea’s action has hit China’s bottom line, and undermined China’s fundamental interests.
The behavior, way of thinking and logic of North Korea show the failure of “Engagement Policy,” which has been implemented by South Korea, China, Russia and the U.S. The international community must shift from the previous stance and policy, and take more adequate preparation and responsive measures for the worsening situation on the Korean peninsula. Only by this means can North Korea’s extreme behavior be stopped.
First of all, the international community must punish North Korea’s erroneous action with diplomatic isolation. If North Korea always neglects international opinions, violates international agreements, ignores international law, breaks its commitments, behaves dishonestly and in an unprincipled manner, conducts extreme behaviors, and undermines prospects for peace on the Korean peninsula, why should the international community take North Korea’s interests into consideration? The international community should give North Korea a lesson, teach North Korea to fulfill its responsibilities and obligations, and let it know that nobody has unilateral responsibility to give support, respect and cooperation to North Korea. After all, the premise of all the assistance and help that has been provided is the fulfillment of bilateral obligations. Do not promise rights without obligations. China, Russia, South Korea, the U.S., and Japan should resolutely and clearly express their standing position, that is: If North Korea continues to develop nuclear weapons and still doesn’t make a firm commitment to the denuclearization agreement arrived at in the Six-Party Talks, isolation from the international community is inevitable.
Secondly, the international community must substantially reduce or even stop the aid to North Korea. Because of “North-South relations” and friendship, China and South Korea give North Korea a lot of help, trying to help North Korea to overcome difficulties. However, if North Korea doesn’t stop undermining prospects for peace on the Korean peninsula, its actions recklessly hurt the Chinese and South Korean peoples’ hearts. Why should China and South Korea help and support North Korea? International humanitarian assistance and mutually beneficial bilateral trades which don’t violate United Nations resolutions could proceed, but unilateral assistance is not necessary, not responsible, and is meaningless. If North Korea still insists on its incorrect position, and if diplomatic measures can’t realize the denuclearization of North Korean peninsula, more serious economic sanction should be taken into consideration.
Thirdly, China should prepare itself for the worst-case situation. In recent decades, the North Korea Administration’s thinking and logic have always been absurd and abnormal. This is very dangerous! China had better abandon its regular experiential cognition and thinking towards North Korea, namely, that North Korea’s behavior is aimed at the U.S. and South Korea instead of China; that North Korea’s nuclear weapons are aimed at the U.S. and South Korea, and are not a threat to China. Historically, serious Sino-Soviet border bloodshed incident and the Sino-Vietnam war did occur between the so-called close “brother parties” and “brother nations.” For many years, North Korea has ignored China’s assistance during the Korean War, even denies China’s qualifications to participate in the negotiation of a Peace Agreement to end the Korean War. How can China have any trust of and expectations for North Korea?
The tensions on the Korean peninsula pose threats to China in two ways. On the one hand, the possibility of the outbreak of direct military conflict will increase. Recently, North Korea conducted a serious action to undermine the peace of Korean peninsula, furthermore, it announced to quit “Armistice Agreement” which sharpened the tensions. The U.S., Japan and South Korea have reacted militarily and activated their own crisis response plans. On the other hand, even if a war in Korean peninsula can be prevented temporarily or through the near future, North Korea’s deadly desire for nuclear weapons still poses a severe long-term threat. If unresolved, the U.S. would dispatch more military forces to the Pacific, and strengthen the U.S. military force in Japan and South Korea; right-wing forces in Japan takes chance to publicize “North Korea Threat Theory” and attempts to develop military forces. Once the situation evolves like this, Northeast Asia would be like a potential “powder keg” with nuclear weapons. It will be a serious long-term problem for China, even the whole world. In consideration of North Korea’s extreme behaviors, China must prepare itself well on the Korean peninsula issues for even more severe situation, such as preparations for military conflicts.
Of course, right now and in the near future, the door of dialogue, engagement and negotiation should not be closed. China and South Korea could maintain some contacts with the North. The Six-Party Talks have not been a total failure; we should still take efforts to proceed it. For the North Korea nuclear test issue, China must take active measures to urge North Korea to abandon nuclear weapons and realize the denuclearization of Korean peninsula. At present, the Six-Party Talks are the best way to solve the North Korea nuclear issue peacefully. The second nuclear test of North Korea doesn’t mean the failure of the Six-Party Talks, and doesn’t mean that the North Korea nuclear issue can’t be solved through the Six-Party Talks.
Nevertheless, the serious situation tells us that we must change the way of solving the North Korea nuclear issue. Negotiation, engagement and assistance alone can not do it. In the past Six-Party Talks, especially the fourth, fifth and sixth rounds of talks, in consideration of North Korea’s economy and energy needs, each party and North Korea had reached agreement on three common documents calling for North Korea’s denuclearization. However, North Korea tore up the agreements in an instant. North Korea’s behavior shows two points: one, North Korea isn’t satisfied with all the assistance it has gotten; second, North Korea believes it could bear the consequences brought by tearing up the agreement. This time the international community adopted more stringent sanctions. North Korea should learn the lesson and get smart. Meanwhile, the peaceful measures towards North Korea should last for a while, which will give North Korea a chance to adjust its own policy and strategy, and give the peaceful solution of Korean peninsula issue the last opportunity. If this effort is still in vain, it’s not too late to turn to more severe counter-North Korea policies. The North Korean government should keep in mind that, in the 21st century, provocation, self-isolation, threat and intimidation are useless and unfeasible—it is doomed to fail!
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North Korea Nuclear Test and Cornered China
North Korea’s second nuclear test on May 25, 2009 was not unexpected. By threatening to strengthen its nuclear deterrence by all means on April 28, Pyongyang quite clearly signaled it would go all the way to defy the international community following its controversial missile test-firing on April 5 and the announced withdraw out of the Six-Party Talks and restoration its nuclear facilities on April 14. Thereby, the second nuclear test, the next step in the “Dear Leader” frenzy, did not stun Beijing. What has stunned Beijing for the moment is the North Korean approach to conducting the nuclear test.
How could North Koreans complete the preparation of nuclear explosion test only within the short time span of one month, presumably between April 28 and May 25? How was N. Korea able to move so precipitously to have its second A-bomb blast? Chinese experts contend that it would at least take half a year for N. Korea to locate the detonation point, dig the deep hole to install nuclear bomb and finish off the testing apparatus around it. If this estimate is correct, it means that North Korea had decided to explode its second nuclear bomb no later than the end of last year.
It’s quite appalling. It’s very clear that Pyongyang meant to conduct the second nuclear test whatever the state of relations was between N. Korea and the international community after the missile launch in early April, whether for missile testing or a satellite launch. Furthermore, if it is true that N. Korea meant to explode its second nuclear device as early as the end of 2008, then all the successive events and actions by Pyongyang over the past three months are the outcome of a strategy and indicate North Korea’s grave calculations. This fact is obviously striking Chinese leadership because it reveals that Pyongyang’s nuclear ambition is totally impossible to roll back as long as Kim Jong Il stays in power. His embrace of nuclear weapons mania is less dependent on whether the international community can somehow satisfy him, and hinges more on Kim Jong Il’s personal determination that N. Korea should be a nuclear power.
That means the DPRK might use the vacuum where US new administration has no intent, in the earlier days of the Obama presidency, to try coercive diplomacy to push nuclear dismantlement. North Korea may want to establish a fundamental reality of a nuclear North, forcing the other parties to swallow this bitter fruit. Unless the format of diplomatic process changes in the favor of the DPRK, apparently, Pyongyang says it will not return to the previous track,Six-Party Talks, and will not bargain simultaneously with the other five parties any more, as it has long complained about how Six-Party Talks make it feel like it is being indicted publicly. By testing its second nuclear bomb, Pyongyang attempts to tell the world that it should be perceived as the conductor on podium.
Traditionally, Beijing’s policy of mediating the DPRK nuclear crisis and hosting the Six-Party Talks has been primarily based on Chinese proposition that N. Korea’s nuclear effort is a negotiable item. As long as its regime security and economic demands could be met, Pyongyang might be willing to give up its “nuclear card.” For the time being, it seems to me that all evidence points in the opposite direction. In fact, the recent nuclear testing by DPRK is not merely a slap in the Chinese face, but a sobering wake-up call for Chinese leadership to face up to the malign nature of their N. Korean counterparts.
It’s still too early to say what Beijing would prefer to do imminently against the relentless provocation of N. Korea. Yet, the breaking of China’s illusion—this is to say, that DPRK could be dismantled of its nuclear capability by negotiation—will very likely bring about the fundamental change of China’s long-time policy of DPRK quickly. The reason is simple: the DPRK’s temporary possession of nuclear weapon is not scary because it could be eventually eliminated. N. Korea’s secretive conspiracy to become a de jure nuclear power, however, has recklessly crossed the “bottom line” in the eyes of Beijing and will inevitably and catastrophically lead to the collapse of multinational talks.
Presumably, Beijing will fully engage others parties and seek for a new UN Security Council resolution to address the common concerns. But this time, Beijing will not offer any protection for DPRK if the Security Council decides that a tougher policy is what Pyongyang deserves.
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North Korea’s Nuclear Noise
North Korea has conducted an underground nuclear test and couple of missile tests on May 25, sending shockwaves across the world. With condemnation from the international community has been pouring fast, the fears of further isolation of this communist country increased substantially. According to its state run media, KCNA, the latest test was “part of measures to strengthen country’s nuclear power in self-defense.”¯ In early October 2006, North Korea had tested its first ever nuclear device . However, the latest device tested today was more improvised in terms of its explosive power and technology. Russian sources have confirmed that Monday’s blast was between 10 and 20 kilotons.
There was also a series of three surface -to-air missile (SAM) reportedly fired from Musudan-ri, Hwadae County. Desperate to gain a legitimate nuclear weapon state status, Pyongyang’s communist regime has yet again overlooked the impoverished condition of its own people.
Enraged International Community
United States: President Barack Obama urging the innternatioal community to take action in response.said:
North Korea’s nuclear ballistic missile programs pose a great threat to the peace and security of the world and I strongly condemn their reckless action.North Korea’s actions endanger the people of Northeast Asia, they are a blatant violation of international law, and they contradict North Korea’s own prior commitments.
Japan: Takeo Kawamura, Chief Cabinet Secretary said
the test was unacceptable and a violation of a U.N. Security Council Resolution
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India: The Defense Minister AK Antony termed the nuclear test as serious concern for India and the world.
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