Guest Post: Amy Searight on the Politics of Climate Change in Asia

The Politics of Climate Change in Asia

This is a guest post by Amy Searight, Adjunct Fellow at the Japan Chair of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and Adjunct Professor at the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University.

The comparison of climate change politics across Asia’s widely disparate countries has yielded some fascinating insights. Asia-Pacific countries divide roughly into two groups. The first group consists of more ambitious countries, with governments willing and able to take a forward leaning stance on climate change policies, including Korea, Japan, Indonesia, and to some extent Australia under the Labor government. The other group includes those countries facing severe domestic constraints and reluctant to take the lead in climate change policy, such as China, India, and the United States. 

Interestingly, this grouping does not break down along lines of advanced versus emerging market economies or between more and less economically developed countries. The analyses of these scholars highlighted the ways in which countries define their interests differently and uniquely, depending on perception of opportunities at the international level, as well as the domestic political situation faced by governments at home.

One common strategic constraint facing all countries in international collaboration on climate change is the collective action dilemma. No country wants to assume an unfair burden by contributing more than their “fair share” of carbon reductions. This common problem is made more acute by concerns over competitiveness and carbon leakage – the risk that self-imposed limits on carbon emissions will drive up local industrial costs higher than countries (notably China) that insist on less stringent restrictions.  All countries want to avoid a “suckers payoff” in the strategic game of climate change cooperation.

And yet, despite this common strategic dilemma, the politics of climate change policy are playing out quite differently across these countries. Several key Asian governments have sought to use climate change to their domestic and international advantage. Rather than focusing on costs and constraints, these governments are framing the issue as one of opportunities. Korea and Japan, for example, are both seeking to take leading roles in global efforts to mitigate climate change. The current governments in both countries see several advantages to positioning themselves as “green leaders.” First, playing a lead and constructive role in global talks on climate change is an opportunity to boost international stature and augment their “soft power” by being seen as “green powers.” Second, both countries see first-mover advantages in restructuring their economies to promote green technologies. Despite substantial opposition from industry in both countries, the governments of President Lee in Korea and the Prime Minister Hatoyama in Japan are able to frame their ambitious environmental agendas in ways that are sustaining broad public support.

Another comparatively forward leaning country is Indonesia. President Yudhoyono has proposed ambitious unilateral reduction targets for emissions, and has offered even higher reductions with international support. Like Korea, Indonesia sees an opportunity to play a leading role in international climate change discussions as a “bridge” between diverse countries, as a developing country, an oil producer, and an archipelago highly vulnerable to the impacts of climate change. The government is also motivated by the prospect of gaining international financial support, as well as the comparatively low cost of mitigation policies that would come from tackling the problems of deforestation, forest fires and peatland degradation, which contribute more than half of Indonesia’s greenhouse gas emissions.

As these examples illustrate, the comparison of these seven Asia-Pacific countries suggest that variables on both the international and domestic levels are central to explaining national variation in climate change politics. In addition to the international opportunities and constraints discussed above, the key domestic political variables include:

—The government:  how does the current government view climate change policies in terms of partisan electoral considerations?  Are leaders personally involved in and committed to policy outcomes?  Are bureaucratic rivalries shaping policies in positive or negative ways? 

—Opposition:  Are groups opposed to climate change policies organized and coherent, or fragmented?  Is there a strong political party who stands against the government on the issue?  Is the business community unified in opposition to climate change, or is it divided by competing interests?

—The broad public debate over climate change:  Where does public opinion stand on the issue of global warming and climate change?  How much acceptance vs. skepticism of scientific beliefs on climate change is expressed by the public?  Is the question of cost (in monetary terms) clearly defined in public discussion over climate change policies?  To what extent are concerns about competitiveness and carbon leakage the focus of public debate?  How do cultural understandings and environmental features of each country shape the public debate?

Further comparative analysis on these questions will yield additional insights into the likely trajectories of climate change policies in key Asian nations.  These in turn may help identify possible roadblocks to international efforts on climate change, as well as suggest potential areas of cooperation on the global and regional level.

Through the Politics of Climate Change in Asia project, CSIS is looking in-depth at how the Asia-Pacific region can work together to address the challenges of climate change, energy insecurity, and humanitarian crises in the years ahead.  As part of this initiative, CSIS held a roundtable on the Politics of Climate Change in Asia during the brief lull between two major snowstorms that hit Washington D.C. in February.  Scholars drawn from across the Asia-Pacific region braved the blizzard-like travel conditions and gathered at CSIS to discuss papers analyzing the domestic and international politics shaping the emerging perspectives and policies on climate change in their respective countries.  The scholars included Kiyoaki Aburaki (writing on Japan); Malcolm Cook (Australia); Prem Shankar Jha (India); Sarah Ladislaw (the United States); Wonhyuk Lim (Korea); Agus P. Sari (Indonesia); and Zhu Feng (China), along with CSIS scholars and a range of other experts on climate change and regional politics.  To learn more, visit the CSIS Asian Regionalism page. 

Posted by Matthew Shannon Stumpf on March 17, 2010. Respond »

New Asia Security Initiative Policy Research

ASI participants have published two new policy research papers this week, on the effect of trade on East Asian alliances and on the impact of upcoming elections in Burma on ceasefire groups.

A new East Asia Institute Working Paper, “Ties That Bind? Assessing the Impact of Economic Interdependence on East Asian Alliances,” by Dong Sun Lee and Sung Eun Kim of Korea University, questions whether “increasing economic interdependence markedly strengthens East Asian security alliances.”

A new Centre for Security Analysis Security Watch, “Going to the Polls: Opportunity or Setback for Myanmar’s Ceasefire Groups?,” finds that groups that have agreed to ceasefires with the Burmese junta are “divided in the run up to Myanmar’s first elections in twenty years ...”

Posted by Matthew Shannon Stumpf on March 2, 2010. Respond »

“Four Scenarios for a Nuclear North Korea”

Over in the Asia Security Initiative News, read the East Asia Institute’s report on a recent “Smart Talk” session by Joel Wit of Columbia University. Wit urges “positive engagement that evolves from a durable process.”

Posted on December 9, 2009. Respond »

Special Report: Chun on the ROK-U.S. Relationship after President Obama’s Asia Trip

Toward a Smart Alliance: The ROK-U.S. Relationship after President Obama’s Asia Trip

By Chaesung Chun

Read another version of this opinion in Korean here.

Asia is the region where a quarter of the total of American products is consumed, major bilateral allies exist, various networks of multilateral institutions operate, and new powers are rising. President Obama, during his first Asia trip, tried to emphasize that America is an Asia-Pacific power that will continue its commitment through a renewed East Asia strategy of “power of balance.” Now at the crossroads of China’s foreign policy of “harmony,” Japan’s new concept of “fraternity,” and South Korea’s catchphrase of “pragmatic foreign policy,” the United States needs to refresh its role which has been defined as a “regional stabilizer.” People in Asia are eager to see President Obama’s new approach to his East Asia strategy, because he inherited from his predecessor a triple crisis in the areas of security, soft power, and economy. President Obama’s recent Asia trip has certainly attracted the minds of many people in Asia with his concepts of strong “partnership,” and a positive-sum Asian future, as expressed in his address at the Suntory Hall, Japan. As the communication power of a network becomes more important in 21st century international politics, President Obama’s Asia trip means a lot with his efforts for public diplomacy.

Putting aside images and metaphors, the strategic orientation of the United States’ East Asia strategy still needs to be more specified. People in Asia are concerned about four areas: 1) how the United States will cooperate with a rising China in producing a consensus in many sensitive and difficult areas such as military competition, economic interdependence, climate change, and ideational orientation; 2) how the United States will redefine the role of bilateral alliances which should go beyond the task of military cooperation, stretching to regional security and non-traditional security issues; 3) how the United States will facilitate the creation and the development of multilateral cooperative institutions by actively participating in them; 4) and how the US will deal with security threats such as the North Korean nuclear crisis, cross-Strait relations, East Asian nationalism, and, most of all, regional power transition. So far, the United States seems to be more focused upon recovery from the economic crisis and getting help from various Asian partners in this effort. That leaves open the question of how to redefine the United States’ role in the rapidly changing environment of Asian international relations.

Despite a relatively short stay in Seoul for about 20 hours, President Obama confirmed his commitment to South Korea with renewed words and statements: he underscored the importance of the KORUS FTA not just from an economic perspective, but also from a strategic standpoint; he promised to provide continued extended nuclear deterrence; he basically agreed with South Korea’s approach to resolving the North Korean nuclear problem through a more comprehensive deal; and he highlighted new areas of cooperation at the global level such as climate change, Afghanistan, economic recovery, and the development of the G-20. South Koreans expect that the KORUS FTA will be the stepping stone for strengthening bilateral economic and strategic relations, recovery of both countries’ economies, and improving interdependent regional economic relations. Regarding the North Korean nuclear crisis, it seems that there is still a lot more to be done in making North Korea give up completely its nuclear program. This will require more intense and creative dialogue between Seoul and Washington. As North Korea has not made any strategic decision regarding its nuclear program and any future national strategic orientation, its return to the Six-Party Talks will only just be the beginning in yet another difficult series of negotiations. South Korea, as a strong American ally and a potential global middle power, will continue to work closely with the United States. The two countries need to search for new tasks and functions for bilateral cooperation in a world of rapidly changing international relations, where “smart” alliance and “21st century international statecraft” are required.

Posted by Matthew Shannon Stumpf on November 23, 2009. Respond »

Special Report: Rajagopalan on Feminist Flashpoints in East Asia

As President Obama travels through East Asia, he provides South Asian feminist scholars with an opportunity to look east and review those issues that have been contentious for women’s rights activists. Each of the President’s stopovers has its own feminist flashpoints that are either consequences of society’s engagement with the outside world or that have consequences for that engagement. 

The movement of people is one of the main sources of concern for Japanese feminists. Women’s immigration from other parts of Asia into Japan when legal is largely in the “entertainment” category, with most immigrants working as bar hostesses, in factories, as commercial sex workers or waitresses. International marriages through brokers are known; along with the old pattern of Japanese wife/ non-Japanese husband now there are also Japanese men who seek non-Japanese but Asian wives either for more control in the marriage or for sham marriages that cover up and facilitate exploitation. (See Vera Mackie’s Feminism in Modern Japan: Citizenship, Embodiment and Sexuality, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003 for more.)

The Japanese also have to confront their status both as perpetrators and victims on the question of wartime sexual exploitation. If the use of “comfort women” during Japan’s mid-20th century occupation of Korea is a history Japan has to live down at minimum and apologize and compensate for at best, then Japan’s own experience with the US presence in Okinawa has been similar. Either way, women have simply been the spoils of militarization, not uniquely in East Asia but here this issue has acquired both feminist and nationalist resonance.

Singaporean women’s organizations have to walk a tightrope, calling attention to social inequities without criticizing the state; placing the blame on culture without blaming religion; being political by virtue of working on political questions, but all the while abjuring politics. Reproductive rights have been one arena of activism, but in insider-for-self-correction mode rather than as dissent or critique of the state’s agenda. Many women from other parts of Asia come to Singapore to undertake jobs as domestic workers. Their status and their rights become political issues in their countries of origin, but in my admittedly cursory search, it was not clear how much their presence registered with the local women’s movement. (Lenore Lyons has written a great deal on the women’s movement in Singapore.)

Shanghai is now one of Asia’s showpiece cities; Beijing is one of its oldest capitals. Through much of the twentieth century, women activists were as focused on nation-building and social modernization issues as their male colleagues. State feminism under the People’s Republic did self-consciously address the institutional and many structural issues relating to the status of women. In the public sphere, gender became irrelevant for both men and women in many ways. Since the 1990s, when China has opened up to the world and western feminist writing has been translated and made available, Chinese feminists are now critiquing this same effacement of gender identity and blaming this for the invisibility of women in many spheres.

From a South Asian perspective, what is most interesting is to look at the impact of how China has opened up and grown, on women’s lives, their decision-making frames and freedoms and finally, gendered expectations that they may now face. Given that China’s political opening is yet to equal its economic changes, it is hard to see what the emerging internal critiques and debates are among Chinese feminists. Whatever they are, they matter for international relations for two reasons. One, there are a lot of aspirants to growth along the Chinese model (or should I say, Shanghai model). For them, this could be an early warning of problems they should anticipate and address. Two, insofar as the Shanghai model is identified elsewhere with the replacement by American-style capitalist economics of socialist development models, its failures will be seen as American failures, exported to Asia. It is in US interests to appear introspective and self-critical with regard to socio-economic issues on the home-front.

Two important strands to the women’s activism in Korea appear to be improving working conditions for women and of course, the issue of “comfort women.” As elsewhere, sexual violence—its prevention, protection issues and victim support services—is a priority for most organizations. It was hard to find very descriptive accounts from which I could learn more.

Two issues seem to recur in this region. The first relates to democracy and space in the public sphere for social activism at all: in its absence or where it is strained, how likely is it that activists will prioritize women’s rights over civil rights and political reform agendas? Women are likely, yet again, to have to take a number and wait their turn. The other is that although my post scarcely suggests it, sexual violence is an important rallying point. Reading about Japan, I learned that in some cases, what were originally shelters for refugees were also taking in victims of domestic violence. That to me really underscores the continuum of violence in which most women’s lives play out. And violence in the name of the state—during war, to reinforce state rules, to ensure regime survival—is one stretch on this continuum.

States are bound by international convention to do business with other states. What this means is that when any head of state comes calling, s/he must meet and confer with whatever regime is in power. A strident discourse on human rights and democracy usually becomes background noise as a summit plays out—that’s diplomacy. But where then is the space for women’s rights issues to be raised and discussed in the international arena? Will we have seen something new in the course of President Obama’s international excursions this time and in coming months?

Posted by Swarna Rajagopalan on November 19, 2009. Respond »