Guest Post: Violence in the Philippines

Guns, Goons, Gold and the War on Terror

This post is by David Gorman, Philippines Representative of the Centre For Humanitarian Dialogue.

The brutal slaying of almost 60 unarmed civilians, including women, children and journalists in Mindanao, Southern Philippines in the last week of November, is a stark reminder that violence is that Islamic extremism isn’t the only cause of armed violence in the region.

In a planned operation, the victims were systematically executed by one clan’s henchman bent on sending a message to a rival clan competing against it in local elections. Sadly, while the scale of the brutality may have been unprecedented, the killings were not unpredictable. 

Despite the country’s vibrant democratic system, across the Philippines most provincial political leaders employ licensed armed individuals for protection and in some cases intimidation of their rivals. It’s said that to win an election in the Philippines, one needs the three ‘G’s: Guns, Goons and Gold.

In Mindanao, however, levels of armed violence have reached an intolerable level. For decades, the national government has tolerated, legitimized, or in some cases even supported through the provision of arms and legal cover, efforts by indigenous clans to arm themselves in Mindanao. National politicians tolerated or supported armed civilian militias so long as the clans were able to secure votes in their favor come national elections.

While the creation of armed civilian militias in Mindanao was often done under the guise of assisting in the War on Terror, combating separatists or serving as “force multipliers,” in reality these armed groups, which now number in the thousands, were more often than not employed against rival clans. Without a question most violence in Mindanao is caused by clan violence rather by terrorists or separatists.

Unfortunately, the system has been allowed to flourish so widely that it is has now become nearly impossible for anyone to reasonably compete for political power without the support of an armed group. The unarmed convoy of the Mangudadatu clan slaughtered in late November attests to that. Sadly, those that try to change the system often find themselves without support and drawn back into politics by the gun.

Although the Philippines is an extreme case, the need for policies to curb armed violence linked to the exercise of democracy in Southeast Asia is becoming evident in countries like Thailand and Indonesia as well. In the past two weeks the Thai Prime Minister called off a visit to the northern city of Chiang Mai after a haul of arms was discovered at the home of an opposition activist.

One way to address the problem is to ban private armed groups or civilian militias. In 2007, the Provincial Council of Sulu, considered the most violent of the provinces in Mindanao, passed a resolution disbanding private armed groups and banning the carrying of firearms. The measure was hailed locally and internationally and the Sulu Governor made it his personal mission to implement it. The Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue which has been working in Sulu since 2005 lent its support by establishing a multi-stakeholder project known as the Armed Violence Reduction Initiative. 

Unfortunately this laudable initiative was undermined by a series of high profile kidnappings, an assassination attempt on the Governor by a rival clan and stepped up attacks by the terrorist listed Abu Sayyaf. 

As the Philippines approaches one its more important national elections in recent memory, Presidential candidates, all of whom are calling for “change” and have condemned the massacre, need to convey precisely how they plan to ensure this level of violence does not occur again. This will involve some tough choices. Some of the measure they might consider include the following:

1. Launch an inquiry not just into the massacre but into the role, value, lines of command and unaccountability of all armed groups outside of the police and the military.

2. Suspend the operations and licenses of all armed groups currently supported by the military, the police and the local government until the elections are complete.

3. Develop a longer term plan for the eventual phasing out of private armed groups complemented by the development and improvement of the regular armed forces and the police.

4. Enforce the current election gun ban and suspend all candidates whose supporters violate it.

Without question, the real cause of insecurity, underdevelopment and fodder for terrorists and criminals in Mindanao has been the system of violent clan rule that has been tolerated and supported for too long in the interests of political expediency. Too often focused on the war on the terror the international community has overlooked the fact that violent clan politics is the principle contributor to the cycle of poverty, marginalization, and insecurity that has created a breeding ground for Islamic extremists and separatists. It has also failed to support the efforts of those political clans or even members of some notoriously violent political clans who have tried to move beyond the politics of guns, goons and gold.

Posted by Matthew Shannon Stumpf on December 7, 2009. Respond »

Guest Post: Nansiri Iamsuk on Civilian Displacement in Mindanao

The following is a guest post by Nansiri Iamsuk of the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue in Manila.

Endless civilian displacement in Mindanao

The conflict in Mindanao between the Government and the Muslim Moro separatist movement in the Philippines has lasted for four decades. Although there have been several peace process achievements between the conflicting parties, the conflict has continued. Given the prolonged high cost in terms of human development and security, there is a need for the Philippine government, as well as the international community, to redouble efforts to resolve this long running conflict and pay close attention to the issue of civilian protection.

The “all-out-war” policy against the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) in 2000 forced almost a million people into internal displacement in Mindanao. Then there was a cease fire which included guidelines for providing protection for internally displaced persons (IDPs) signed by the two parties. However, many of these IDPs had not returned to their homes before another round of fighting between the two sides erupted in 2003, which resulted in further displacement. The fighting in 2003 generated around 400,000 IDPs scattered all over Mindanao. Then another ceasefire was signed in late 2003 and in 2004 the Malaysian-led International Monitoring Team (IMT) was established to closely observe ceasefire violations. This international monitoring presence allowed some of the IDPs to return to their communities. When the IMT was withdrawn in the beginning of 2008, the rehabilitation of those IDPs was consequently disrupted.

Then in August 2008, the conflict erupted again after the Supreme Court issued a temporary restraining order on the Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) which was about being signed by the Philippine Government and the MILF in Malaysia. The collapse of the MOA-AD immediately provoked fighting between the Philippine army and MILF forces in Mindanao. The clash forced approximately 700,000 people into displacement. Based on the National Disaster Coordinating Council of the Philippines on July 14, 2009, 254,119 persons remained displaced in Mindanao, particularly in the area of Region X, Region XII and ARMM. Of that number, 118,907 people were in some 147 evacuation centers. Another 135,212 were home-based IDPs staying with their relatives or friends.

It has been already a year since the last attack, and the IDPs still cannot resume their normal lives. A lot of them are living in severe physical conditions. A number of deaths in evacuation centers are attributed to the conditions they live in. A number of humanitarian organizations offer relief and aid for the IDPs, however the lack of coordination among them results in the oversupply of provisions. Thus, the IDPs end up selling their aid to local businesses for very low prices to get cash to buy what they really need for their survival. In addition, the protection provided for the IDPs is relatively weak. A number of human rights violation cases in and outside of the evacuation centers are found but not filed.

The two parties have now resumed talks, however, the issue of protecting civilians from forced displacement is an ongoing humanitarian crisis and the parties need to negotiate it quickly, unhindered by larger, more complicated final resolution issues. Therefore, it is necessary for both parties to set up a dialogue process to find solution for the IDPs. The guidelines on the rehabilitation for IDPs which the two parties signed in the Tripoli peace agreement in 2001 should be seriously considered as a model.  Most importantly both parties have to affirm their declarations on suspension of military operations agreed upon at the end of July as they greatly impact on the safety of IDPs.

Moreover, the protection of the IDPs in Mindanao should not be only led by the Philippine government; the international community also needs to take stronger action. The idea of reconstituting the IMT or inventing a similar operation would help enhance protection for displaced people in the region. Also the newly created ASEAN inter-governmental human rights mechanism should take the issue of displacement in the region as one of its priorities.

Posted by Matthew Shannon Stumpf on September 11, 2009. Respond »