Blog
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In the News: Mapping Terror in Pakistan Since 9/11
A research compilation conducted by Pakistan media The News (Jang group) indicates that the country has witnessed 332 terrorism related incidents that claimed 5,704 lives since September 2001. The research aimed primarily at documenting violent developments which Pakistan experienced (due to) following the US-led War against Terror in the region. The research used open source information including statistics and chronology recorded by the US Department of State, archives of Pakistani newspapers and web portals.
Some Highlights:
Pakistan has lost around $35 billion since joining the still-continuing War on Terror.
The country witnessed only two terror-related incidents in 2001, 14 in 2002, just 8 in 2003, 18 in 2004, 11 in 2005, 16 in 2006, 56 in 2007, 72 in 2008, 130 in 2009 and 29 in the first two-and-a-half months of 2010 till the fling of this report. The year 2009 of course remained the bloodiest of all with 130 incidents claiming around 1,800 lives, followed by 2008 which saw 1,565 people falling prey to 72 such attacks.
High Profile Assassinations:
Terror in Pakistan claimed the lives of eminent personalities like the two-time Premier Benazir Bhutto (December 27, 2007), eminent Deobandi scholar and head of Islamic religious school Jamia Binoria, Mufti Nizamuddin Shamzai (May 30, 2004), leading Shia scholar and Chief of Tehrik-e-Jafaria Pakistan, Allama Hassan Turabi (July 14, 2006), Chief of Peshawar City Police Malik Saad (January 27, 2007), former Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam MNA and Wafaqul Madaris Vice Chairman Maulana Hassan Jan (September 15, 2007), Pakistan Army’s top medic Lt Gen Mushtaq Baig (February 25, 2008), former head of Pakistan Army’s Special Services Group Maj Gen (R) Ameer Faisal Alvi (November 19, 2008), Awami National Party Provincial law-maker Alam Zeb Khan (February 11, 2009), leading Sunni Barelwi cleric Sarfraz Ahmed Naeemi (June 12, 2009), Punjab-born Balochistan Education Minister Shafiq Ahmed Khan (October 25, 2009), Balochistan’s Deputy Inspector General Nizam Shahid Durrani (November 19, 2009), ANP politician Shamsher Ali Khan (December 1, 2009), former NWFP Education Minister Ghani-ur-Rehman (January 3, 2010), Peshawar’s District Police Officer Iqbal Marwat (February 12, 2010) and Jamaat Ahl-e-Sunnat’s key leaders Mufti Saeed Jalalpuri (March 11, 2010) and Maulana Abdul Ghafoor Nadeem (March 14, 2010).
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Guest Post: Amy Searight on the Politics of Climate Change in Asia
The Politics of Climate Change in Asia
This is a guest post by Amy Searight, Adjunct Fellow at the Japan Chair of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and Adjunct Professor at the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University.
The comparison of climate change politics across Asia’s widely disparate countries has yielded some fascinating insights. Asia-Pacific countries divide roughly into two groups. The first group consists of more ambitious countries, with governments willing and able to take a forward leaning stance on climate change policies, including Korea, Japan, Indonesia, and to some extent Australia under the Labor government. The other group includes those countries facing severe domestic constraints and reluctant to take the lead in climate change policy, such as China, India, and the United States.
Interestingly, this grouping does not break down along lines of advanced versus emerging market economies or between more and less economically developed countries. The analyses of these scholars highlighted the ways in which countries define their interests differently and uniquely, depending on perception of opportunities at the international level, as well as the domestic political situation faced by governments at home.
One common strategic constraint facing all countries in international collaboration on climate change is the collective action dilemma. No country wants to assume an unfair burden by contributing more than their “fair share” of carbon reductions. This common problem is made more acute by concerns over competitiveness and carbon leakage – the risk that self-imposed limits on carbon emissions will drive up local industrial costs higher than countries (notably China) that insist on less stringent restrictions. All countries want to avoid a “suckers payoff” in the strategic game of climate change cooperation.
And yet, despite this common strategic dilemma, the politics of climate change policy are playing out quite differently across these countries. Several key Asian governments have sought to use climate change to their domestic and international advantage. Rather than focusing on costs and constraints, these governments are framing the issue as one of opportunities. Korea and Japan, for example, are both seeking to take leading roles in global efforts to mitigate climate change. The current governments in both countries see several advantages to positioning themselves as “green leaders.” First, playing a lead and constructive role in global talks on climate change is an opportunity to boost international stature and augment their “soft power” by being seen as “green powers.” Second, both countries see first-mover advantages in restructuring their economies to promote green technologies. Despite substantial opposition from industry in both countries, the governments of President Lee in Korea and the Prime Minister Hatoyama in Japan are able to frame their ambitious environmental agendas in ways that are sustaining broad public support.
Another comparatively forward leaning country is Indonesia. President Yudhoyono has proposed ambitious unilateral reduction targets for emissions, and has offered even higher reductions with international support. Like Korea, Indonesia sees an opportunity to play a leading role in international climate change discussions as a “bridge” between diverse countries, as a developing country, an oil producer, and an archipelago highly vulnerable to the impacts of climate change. The government is also motivated by the prospect of gaining international financial support, as well as the comparatively low cost of mitigation policies that would come from tackling the problems of deforestation, forest fires and peatland degradation, which contribute more than half of Indonesia’s greenhouse gas emissions.
As these examples illustrate, the comparison of these seven Asia-Pacific countries suggest that variables on both the international and domestic levels are central to explaining national variation in climate change politics. In addition to the international opportunities and constraints discussed above, the key domestic political variables include:
—The government: how does the current government view climate change policies in terms of partisan electoral considerations? Are leaders personally involved in and committed to policy outcomes? Are bureaucratic rivalries shaping policies in positive or negative ways?
—Opposition: Are groups opposed to climate change policies organized and coherent, or fragmented? Is there a strong political party who stands against the government on the issue? Is the business community unified in opposition to climate change, or is it divided by competing interests?
—The broad public debate over climate change: Where does public opinion stand on the issue of global warming and climate change? How much acceptance vs. skepticism of scientific beliefs on climate change is expressed by the public? Is the question of cost (in monetary terms) clearly defined in public discussion over climate change policies? To what extent are concerns about competitiveness and carbon leakage the focus of public debate? How do cultural understandings and environmental features of each country shape the public debate?
Further comparative analysis on these questions will yield additional insights into the likely trajectories of climate change policies in key Asian nations. These in turn may help identify possible roadblocks to international efforts on climate change, as well as suggest potential areas of cooperation on the global and regional level.
Through the Politics of Climate Change in Asia project, CSIS is looking in-depth at how the Asia-Pacific region can work together to address the challenges of climate change, energy insecurity, and humanitarian crises in the years ahead. As part of this initiative, CSIS held a roundtable on the Politics of Climate Change in Asia during the brief lull between two major snowstorms that hit Washington D.C. in February. Scholars drawn from across the Asia-Pacific region braved the blizzard-like travel conditions and gathered at CSIS to discuss papers analyzing the domestic and international politics shaping the emerging perspectives and policies on climate change in their respective countries. The scholars included Kiyoaki Aburaki (writing on Japan); Malcolm Cook (Australia); Prem Shankar Jha (India); Sarah Ladislaw (the United States); Wonhyuk Lim (Korea); Agus P. Sari (Indonesia); and Zhu Feng (China), along with CSIS scholars and a range of other experts on climate change and regional politics. To learn more, visit the CSIS Asian Regionalism page.
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The Importance of Open Diplomacy in Japan
Within a week of the formation of the first Bolshevik government, Leon Trotsky, the People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs, went to the foreign ministry and forced the staff to open safes containing secret treaties that the Tsarist government had made with the Allied powers over the course of World War I, treaties that for the most part concerned how the Allies would divide up the territorial spoils of war.
“Abolition of secret diplomacy,” wrote Trotsky, “is the first essential of an honorable, popular, and really democratic foreign policy.”
Lest anyone think this opposition to secret diplomacy was simply a reflection of the new government’s opposition to the “propertied minority,” the first of Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points was a call for “open covenants of peace, openly arrived at, after which there shall be no private international understandings of any kind but diplomacy shall proceed always frankly and in the public view.” (Although, it should be noted, the Fourteen Points were to a certain extent a response to the Bolsheviks.)
In Japan on Tuesday an expert panel established by the Hatoyama government to review secret agreements made between the US and Japanese governments from the 1960s onward released its report, confirming the existence of the ongoing agreement that permitted the introduction of US nuclear weapons into Japan for the duration of the cold war despite the three non-nuclear principles that would seem to prohibit precisely that. The panel revealed more than 300 documents, although it seems that some were missing. Naturally the panel drew criticism from recent LDP prime ministers, who had continued to deny the existence of the documents despite their existence having been confirmed by declassified US documents. On the other end of the political spectrum, Fukushima Mizuho, consumer affairs minister and head of the Social Democratic Party, praised the report as “ground-breaking.”
My point in linking the Bolshevik government’s release of secret treaties to the Democratic Party of Japan’s release of secret treaties is not to suggest that the DPJ is somehow dangerously radical or akin to the Bolsheviks. After all, by releasing the documents the Bolsheviks damaged the ongoing war effort and triggered Wilson’s efforts to recast the war as something other than a war among empires for territory. To a certain extent, the Hatoyama government is merely rectifying the Japanese side of the historical record, seeing as how the US stopped deploying nuclear weapons overseas at the end of the cold war and confirmed nearly a decade ago that the secret agreement had existed.
My point rather is that concerns about secret diplomacy are not unprecedented, and that they are naturally linked to broader concerns about how a country is governed. In this sense the Hatoyama government is doing more than historical recordkeeping, but rather it is showing that open government does not stop at water’s end. Not content with revealing the many ways in which bureaucrats — under the watch of LDP governments — have wasted taxpayer money, the DPJ wants to show how the LDP conducted foreign relations out of the sight of Japanese voters. It is perhaps easy for the DPJ government to criticize decisions made during the cold war, but then the Hatoyama government would not be the first to question cynical decisions made by governments during the cold war.
The DPJ has in fact been consistent in its opposition to secret diplomacy conducted by LDP-led governments, right up to the present day. When the DPJ opposed the extension of the Indian Ocean refueling mission after taking control of the upper house in 2007, central to its argument was that the government had not been forthright with information about what exactly the ships were doing there. Who was the fuel going to, and what were those ships doing after being refueled?
More importantly, the same concerns drive the Hatoyama government’s approach to the Futenma issue. Lost in the endless amounts of copy written about the dispute is that the Hatoyama government has been animated as much by the process by which the 2006 agreement was reached as by its content. The manifesto upon which the DPJ was elected, after all, promised only a review of the realignment roadmap. It made no promises about what the DPJ would push for instead. As the government has repeatedly stated, it is proceeding from a “zero base” as it conducts its review of the roadmap and possible alternatives. While the negotiation process and the roadmap that resulted were far from secret, the DPJ wanted to review whether LDP governments actually considered all options, skepticism that is not unwarranted given the long history of secret diplomacy with the US.
The Hatoyama government deserves some blame for not being clearer about why it wanted a review in the first place, which enabled some to paint the government as anti-American. But those who see the Futenma dispute in the worst possible light have misinterpreted the Hatoyama government’s position. I think that the Hatoyama government is approaching Futenma less as a foreign policy issue than as a domestic policy issue, because a bilateral agreement as complicated the realignment plan involves too many actors within Japan to be simply a bilateral matter for governments in Tokyo and Washington. Indeed, if the 2006 agreement has a flaw it is that the Koizumi government acted without the full approval of Okinawan constituents, which explains at least in part why subsequent LDP governments did little but drag their feet on implementing the agreement.
The Hatoyama government is acting in good faith in trying to find an agreement that will satisfy all parties, not just the US government. Not surprisingly it has found that “double-edged” diplomacy is tricky, if not impossible — little wonder that governments opt to keep their foreign affairs secret. As the May deadline for its review approaches, hints that the government is leaning towards a plan to build a Futenma replacement facility in Okinawa on land instead of offshore has prompted opposition from local governments and the prefectural assembly, from DPJ secretary-general Ozawa Ichiro, and from the US itself. The whole process could end in failure, with no one happy with the final outcome, least of all the Hatoyama government.
But whether or not the Hatoyama government succeeds, it is important to recognize that it is acting on the basis of an old idea, that a democratic foreign policy must necessarily be conducted in the sight of the people in whose name it is being conducted. In its pursuit of this aim, the Hatoyama government has also implicitly suggested that an alliance conducted behind closed doors is inappropriate for a more democratic Japan, that the alliance will not endure if it continues to rest upon secret agreements and understandings. -
Chinese Tone Down Tough Stance but Spats Remain
China is in its annual political season this month as the 3rd annual session of the 11th National People’s Congress (NPC), China’s top legislative body, is commencing in Beijing. Simultaneously, the Chinese People’s Consultative Conference (CPPCC), part of Chinese Communist Party (CPC)-sponsored “one party rule but multiple-parties collaborating system,” is also entering session. This political season is vividly named “lianghui” (two conferences ). On the sidelines of the “two conferences,” all cabinet members are supposed to hold press conferences stating their policy objectives and taking Q & As in public, one after another on a daily basis.
March 7’s protagonist for NPC daily press conferences was Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi, a seasoned Chinese diplomat and former Chinese Ambassador to the United States. Due to China-US spats over arms sales to Taiwan, President Obama’s meeting with the Dalai Lama, and plenty of trade frictions and wrangling over currency, FM Yang’s press conference drew enormous attention. His background of being an “America hand” in China adds to the public’s curiosity over his possibly refreshed explanation of Beijing’s U.S. policy at this pivotal moment. Additionally, his statement was simply about international concern on Beijing’s expected reaction to a US-circulated draft seeking to impose new sanctions on Teheran. Washington made up its mind to take action vis-à-vis Iran in the UN Security Council, and Beijing has been an important target country in the American diplomatic effort to amass international support. Deputy Secretary of State Jim Steinberg concluded a “quiet” visit to Beijing on March 4. FM Yang’s commentary on China’s Iran policy is a real footnote to Mr. Steinberg’s recent visit.
Unsurprisingly, FM Yang focuses his statement squarely on China-US relations. First of all, he refuses any accusation of a “tough” Chinese response by declaring the suspension of mil-to-mil exchange and proposing sanctions against American companies involved in arms sales to Taiwan. “We stick to our principles, which is totally different from being tough,” FM Yang stresses. “It has always been the mission for China’s diplomacy to defend China’s sovereignty, security and development interests, while promoting world peace and development.” He continued, asking: “Where are justice and principles if one views the actions taken by a country to defend its core interests and dignity as being ‘tough’, and takes for granted actions infringing the interests of others?” In contrast to a Chinese spokesman’s open firing at the U.S. one or two months ago, obviously, Yang’s remark on this nationally live televised occasion sounds very defensive rather than “offensive.” This signals Beijing’s intention that “turbulence” might pass on already, and it would like to see the fire extinguished, with both countries resolving to renew a productive, higher-level dialogue. It’s also a positive sign that Chinese President Hu Jintao might attend the nuclear-free summit in April, which has been an important part of President Obama’s nuclear-free-world diplomatic campaign.
Yet, FM Yang does not forget to keep the blame on the White House for the spats. He continues that the improvement of China-US lies with Washington. His point offers a clue that Beijing hasn’t decided completely yet if President Hu would pay a state visit to the US while he is in New York to attend the nuclear summit meeting. In fact, China has been highly aware of the upcoming Treasury Report about the Chinese government’s role in Chinese currency. Beijing is admittedly set to fire back and even risk revoking President Hu’s planned visit if the US Treasury Report proclaims that Beijing is unfairly manipulating the Chinese Yuan. The most damaging charge that could come from the United States would follow on some U.S. government officials’ views that the Chinese government keeps the yuan undervalued to boost Chinese exports. Therefore, FM Yang’s remark is a reminder of the vulnerability of Beijing-Washington relationship for the time being. Associated with Chinese Central Bank chief Mr. Zhou Xiao Chuan’s proposition that the value of the Chinese Yuan would be unlikely to rise on 6 March 2010 as long as main economies remain mired in slow growth, no one could be blindly optimistic about the prospects of closer China-US cooperation in 2010.
In fact, Beijing’s focus has turned to the growing economic and trading frictions between China and the US. Without effective and appropriate management of their economic and trading disputes, the base of stable and healthy ties between Beijing and Washington will be truly rocky and bumpy. Despite the proposed “core interests” of Taiwan and Tibet, economic and trading link across the Pacific Ocean have become more than “core.” Beijing understands that there are both “structural” matters—US will not abandon its strategic interest in East Asia and its concern for human rights and religious freedom, and at the same time, China will not stop its protesting against the US on these issues. The past two decades have proven that both the sides are able to keep those disputes in check as long as neither acts as a “spoiler” seeking to take advantage of two matters. But Beijing-Washington economic ties have been a glue to keep both parties together. Now they will ominously keep both powers apart?
The Iran issue has been overshadowed by growing China-US economic disputes. Beijing has a big oil stake at Tehran, and therefore is opposed to a hardball policy, including tougher sanctions aimed at Iran’s economy, to prevent from Tehran’s nuclear ambition. Despite the low likeliness of Beijing’s veto to any US-proposed anti-Iran sanctions act in the coming months, FM Yang does not alter his persistent tone on March 7. He unambiguously de-emphasizes the urgency of imposing new sanctions on Iran, and instead calls for committed negotiations. For this moment, to bring President Obama and President Hu to talk in person as soon as possible might be the best tack to navigate through the stormy water of China-US relations. -
New Asia Security Initiative Policy Research
ASI participants have published two new policy research papers this week, on the effect of trade on East Asian alliances and on the impact of upcoming elections in Burma on ceasefire groups.
A new East Asia Institute Working Paper, “Ties That Bind? Assessing the Impact of Economic Interdependence on East Asian Alliances,” by Dong Sun Lee and Sung Eun Kim of Korea University, questions whether “increasing economic interdependence markedly strengthens East Asian security alliances.”
A new Centre for Security Analysis Security Watch, “Going to the Polls: Opportunity or Setback for Myanmar’s Ceasefire Groups?,” finds that groups that have agreed to ceasefires with the Burmese junta are “divided in the run up to Myanmar’s first elections in twenty years ...”
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Recent Posts
- In the News: Mapping Terror in Pakistan Since 9/11 by Animesh Roul
- Guest Post: Amy Searight on the Politics of Climate Change in Asia by Matthew Shannon Stumpf
- Soft power and foreign policy: A link and some thoughts by Swarna Rajagopalan
- In the News: What Indonesia Can Teach Burma by Matthew Shannon Stumpf
- The Importance of Open Diplomacy in Japan by Tobias Harris
- Guest Post: Rohaiza Asi on Conflict Management in Indonesia by Matthew Shannon Stumpf