Posted by Zhu Feng on May 27, 2009. Filed under North Korea, Northeast Asia, Weapons of Mass Destruction.

North Korea’s second nuclear test on May 25, 2009 was not unexpected. By threatening to strengthen its nuclear deterrence by all means on April 28, Pyongyang quite clearly signaled it would go all the way to defy the international community following its controversial missile test-firing on April 5 and the announced withdraw out of the Six-Party Talks and restoration its nuclear facilities on April 14. Thereby, the second nuclear test, the next step in the “Dear Leader” frenzy, did not stun Beijing. What has stunned Beijing for the moment is the North Korean approach to conducting the nuclear test.

How could North Koreans complete the preparation of nuclear explosion test only within the short time span of one month, presumably between April 28 and May 25? How was N. Korea able to move so precipitously to have its second A-bomb blast? Chinese experts contend that it would at least take half a year for N. Korea to locate the detonation point, dig the deep hole to install nuclear bomb and finish off the testing apparatus around it. If this estimate is correct, it means that North Korea had decided to explode its second nuclear bomb no later than the end of last year.

It’s quite appalling. It’s very clear that Pyongyang meant to conduct the second nuclear test whatever the state of relations was between N. Korea and the international community after the missile launch in early April, whether for missile testing or a satellite launch. Furthermore, if it is true that N. Korea meant to explode its second nuclear device as early as the end of 2008, then all the successive events and actions by Pyongyang over the past three months are the outcome of a strategy and indicate North Korea’s grave calculations. This fact is obviously striking Chinese leadership because it reveals that Pyongyang’s nuclear ambition is totally impossible to roll back as long as Kim Jong Il stays in power. His embrace of nuclear weapons mania is less dependent on whether the international community can somehow satisfy him, and hinges more on Kim Jong Il’s personal determination that N. Korea should be a nuclear power.

That means the DPRK might use the vacuum where US new administration has no intent, in the earlier days of the Obama presidency, to try coercive diplomacy to push nuclear dismantlement.  North Korea may want to establish a fundamental reality of a nuclear North, forcing the other parties to swallow this bitter fruit. Unless the format of diplomatic process changes in the favor of the DPRK, apparently, Pyongyang says it will not return to the previous track,Six-Party Talks, and will not bargain simultaneously with the other five parties any more, as it has long complained about how Six-Party Talks make it feel like it is being indicted publicly. By testing its second nuclear bomb, Pyongyang attempts to tell the world that it should be perceived as the conductor on podium. 

Traditionally, Beijing’s policy of mediating the DPRK nuclear crisis and hosting the Six-Party Talks has been primarily based on Chinese proposition that N. Korea’s nuclear effort is a negotiable item. As long as its regime security and economic demands could be met, Pyongyang might be willing to give up its “nuclear card.” For the time being, it seems to me that all evidence points in the opposite direction. In fact, the recent nuclear testing by DPRK is not merely a slap in the Chinese face, but a sobering wake-up call for Chinese leadership to face up to the malign nature of their N. Korean counterparts.

It’s still too early to say what Beijing would prefer to do imminently against the relentless provocation of N. Korea. Yet, the breaking of China’s illusion—this is to say, that DPRK could be dismantled of its nuclear capability by negotiation—will very likely bring about the fundamental change of China’s long-time policy of DPRK quickly. The reason is simple: the DPRK’s temporary possession of nuclear weapon is not scary because it could be eventually eliminated. N. Korea’s secretive conspiracy to become a de jure nuclear power, however, has recklessly crossed the “bottom line” in the eyes of Beijing and will inevitably and catastrophically lead to the collapse of multinational talks. 

Presumably, Beijing will fully engage others parties and seek for a new UN Security Council resolution to address the common concerns. But this time, Beijing will not offer any protection for DPRK if the Security Council decides that a tougher policy is what Pyongyang deserves.